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A celebrated and controversial hypothesis suggests that some biological systems –parts,
aspects, or groups of them– may extract important functional benefits from operating
at the edge of instability, halfway between order and disorder, i.e. in the vicinity of the
critical point of a phase transition. Criticality has been argued to provide biological sys-
tems with an optimal balance between robustness against perturbations and flexibility
to adapt to changing conditions, as well as to confer on them optimal computational
capabilities, huge dynamical repertoires, unparalleled sensitivity to stimuli, etc. Crit-
icality, with its concomitant scale invariance, can be conjectured to emerge in living
systems as the result of adaptive and evolutionary processes that, for reasons to be
fully elucidated, select for it as a template upon which further layers of complexity can
rest. This hypothesis is very suggestive as it proposes that criticality could constitute a
general and common organizing strategy in biology stemming from the physics of phase
transitions. However, despite its thrilling implications, this is still in its embryonic state
as a well-founded theory and, as such, it has elicited some healthy skepticism. From the
experimental side, the advent of high-throughput technologies has created new prospects
in the exploration of biological systems, and empirical evidence in favor of criticality has
proliferated, with examples ranging from endogenous brain activity and gene-expression
patterns, to flocks of birds and insect-colony foraging, to name but a few. Some pieces
of evidence are quite remarkable, while in some other cases empirical data are limited,
incomplete, or not fully convincing. More stringent experimental set-ups and theoretical
analyses are certainly needed to fully clarify the picture. In any case, the time seems
ripe for bridging the gap between this theoretical conjecture and its empirical validation.
Given the profound implications of shedding light on this issue, we believe that it is both
pertinent and timely to review the state of the art and to discuss future strategies and
perspectives.
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2I. INTRODUCTION: STATISTICAL PHYSICS OF
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
One of the greatest challenges of Science is to shed light
on the essence of the phenomenon that we call “life”,
with all its astonishing diversity and complexity. Cells
–the basic building-blocks of life– are intricate dynam-
ical systems consisting of thousand types of interact-
ing molecules, being created, used and destroyed every
minute; multicellular organisms rely on the perfectly or-
chestrated motion of up to trillions of interacting cells,
and communities assemble dozens of individuals, inter-
acting in countless ways, forming entangled ecosystems,
and giving rise to a mind-blowing hierarchy of “complex-
ity”.
The standard viewpoint in biology, stemming from
the reductionist tradition, is that each molecular com-
ponent (protein, nucleic acid, metabolite...) is specific
and requires individualized scrutiny. This one-at-the-
time approach has successfully identified and quantified
most of the components and many of the basic inter-
actions of life as we know it, as stressed by the rapid
advance of the “omics” sciences (genomics, proteomics,
metabolomics...). Still, unfortunately, it offers no con-
vincing explanation of how systemic properties emerge
(Sauer et al., 2007). Questions such as “how are those
myriads of elements and interactions coordinated to-
gether in complex living creatures?” or “how does coher-
ent behavior emerge out of such a soup of highly heteroge-
neous components?” (Schro¨dinger, 1967) remain largely
unanswered.
A complementary strategy consists in looking at com-
plex biological problems from a global perspective, shift-
ing the focus from specific details of the molecular ma-
chinery to integral aspects (Alon, 2006; Bialek, 2012;
Goldenfeld and Woese, 2011; Hartwell et al., 1999;
Kaneko, 2006; Sauer et al., 2007). System approaches
to biology rely on the evidence that some of the most
fascinating phenomena of living systems –such as mem-
ory and the ability to solve problems– are collective ones,
stemming from the interactions of many basic units, and
might not be reducible to the understanding of elemen-
tary components on an individual basis (Bialek, 2018).
Theoreticians have long struggled to elucidate whether
simple and general principles –such as those in physics–
could be of any help in tackling biological complexity.
More specifically, they have long been seduced by the
idea of adapting concepts and methods from statistical
mechanics to shed light onto the large-scale organization
of biological systems1 (Alon, 2006; Amit, 1992; Ander-
1 The possibility that biological problems may stretch the frontiers
of physics by uncovering phenomena and mechanisms unknown
in purely physical systems is also inspiring (Frauenfelder, 2014;
Goldenfeld and Woese, 2011).
son et al., 1972; Bialek, 2012; Haken et al., 1985; Hop-
field, 1982; Kelso, 1984; Parisi, 1993; Schro¨dinger, 1967;
Sneppen, 2014).
One of the most striking consequences of interac-
tions among elementary constituents of matter (atoms,
molecules, electrons...) is the emergence of diverse phases
whose behavior bears little resemblance with that of their
basic components or small groups of them (Anderson
et al., 1972; Chaikin and Lubensky, 2000; Stanley, 1987).
Systems consisting of very many (microscopic) compo-
nents may exhibit rather diverse types of (macroscopic)
collective behavior, i.e. phases, with different levels of
internal order. Moreover, slight changes in external con-
ditions (e.g. temperature, pression...) or in the strength
of interactions may induce dramatic structural rearrange-
ments, i.e. phase transitions.
It is thus tempting to hypothesize that biological states
might be manifestations of similar collective phases and
that shifts between them could correspond to phase tran-
sitions (Anderson et al., 1972; Hopfield, 1994). As a
matter of fact, phase transitions are a common theme
in biology (Pollack and Chin, 2008; Sole´, 2011), as illus-
trated by the following non-exhaustive list of examples:
(i) synchronization phase transitions in collective biolog-
ical oscillators such as circadian clocks (Garcia-Ojalvo
et al., 2004); (ii) percolation transitions of fibers in con-
nective tissues such as collagen (Alvarado et al., 2013;
Forgacs et al., 1991; Newman et al., 2004), (iii) melting
phase transition in DNA strands (Li and Retzloff, 2006;
Poland and Scheraga, 1970); and (iv) transitions between
different dynamical regimes (oscillations, bursting,...) in
neuronal networks (Freeman, 2013; Freeman and Holmes,
2005; Haken, 2013; Kelso, 1984; Rabinovich et al., 2006;
Werner, 2007), etc.
Life –guided by evolution– has found its way to ex-
ploit very diverse types of order: crystalline struc-
tures (seashells, skeletons...), liquid states (blood, lymph,
sap...), gels (vitreous humor, cell cytoplasm), etc. How-
ever, some aspects of biological systems –think e.g. of
neural networks or flocks of birds– exhibit intermediate
levels of organization, half way between order and dis-
order, less regular than perfect crystals but more struc-
tured than random gases. Remarkably, it has been con-
jectured that, under some circumstances, living systems
–i.e. parts, aspects, or groups of them– could draw im-
portant functional advantages from operating right at the
borderline between ordered and disordered phases, i.e.
at the very edge of a (continuous) phase transition or
critical point2 (Bak, 1996; Beggs, 2008; Chialvo, 2010;
Chialvo et al., 2008; Kauffman, 1993; Plenz, 2013; Plenz
2 Phase transitions may occur in either a discontinuous/abrupt
fashion (Binney et al., 1993) –with associate bistability of the
two different phases and an abrupt/discontinuous jump at the
transition point– or in continuous/progressive way with an asso-
3and Niebur, 2014). For instance, rather generically, liv-
ing systems need to achieve a tradeoff between robustness
(resilience of the system state to external perturbations;
which is a property of ordered phase), and flexibility (re-
sponsiveness to environmental stimuli, which is a feature
of disordered phases). An optimal balance between these
two conflicting tendencies can be accomplished by keep-
ing the system dynamical state at the borderline of an
order-disorder phase transition, i.e. at criticality. Signa-
tures of criticality, such as the spontaneous emergence of
long-range spatio-temporal correlations and the exquisite
sensitivity to stimuli are also susceptible to be exploited
for functional purposes, e.g. to create coordinated global
behavior, as we shall discuss in what follows. The idea
that –in some special circumstances– evolution might
have favored states close to the edge of a phase transi-
tion is certainly tantalizing, as it suggests that operating
near criticality could be an overarching strategy in bi-
ological organization (Bak, 1996; Beggs, 2008; Chialvo,
2010; Kauffman, 1993; Mora and Bialek, 2011; Plenz,
2013; Plenz and Niebur, 2014).
Critical points have long been appreciated to exhibit
striking features. Still, given the need of careful fine
tuning for them to be observed, they were long treated
as rarities. The development of some of the most re-
markable intelectual achievements of the second half of
the 20th century, such as the scaling hypothesis and the
renormalization group theory (Fisher, 1974; Wilson and
Kogut, 1974), changed this view and led to an elegant
and precise theory of criticality, with unsuspected im-
plications in many fields, from particle physics to poly-
mer science3. A chief conclusion is that many features at
critical points are quite robust and largely independent of
small-scale details, giving rise to universality in the large-
scale behavior. This has very important consequences
for e.g. studies in biology, as criticality and its concomi-
tant scale-invariance can be understood through simple
stylized models –neglecting many irrelevant details of in-
dividual components and putting the emphasis on how
they interact– paving the road to the understanding of
collective aspects of living systems in relatively simple
terms.
From the experimental side, the advent of high-
throughput techniques and big-data analyses have cre-
ated new prospects in the exploration of biological sys-
tems. This is true, for example, in neuroscience –where
it is now possible to record activity from individual spik-
ing neurons to entire brains with previously-unthinkable
ciated critical point. Our main focus here is on continuous ones,
but we will also encounter discontinuous transitions, which may
also play a relevant role in biology.
3 See, e.g. Binney et al. (1993); De Gennes (1979); Delamotte
(2012); Henkel et al. (2008); Sethna (2006); Stanley (1987);
Ta¨uber (2017).
resolution (Sejnowski et al., 2014)– and, similarly, in
genomics (Lesk, 2017) or in collective motion analyses
(Cavagna et al., 2008). As a result, recent years have
witnessed an upsurge of empirical works reporting on
putative scale-invariance and/or criticality in diverse bi-
ological systems, supporting the above theoretical specu-
lations. In some cases the evidence appears to be robust,
while in others it is marginal, incomplete, or, to say the
least, doubtful. In any case, time seems to be ripe for
bridging the gap between the theoretical hypothesis and
its empirical validation.
The purpose of the present Colloquium is to briefly re-
view the main ideas and motivation behind the criticality
hypothesis as a possible guiding principle in the collec-
tive organization of living systems and to scrutinize and
discuss in a critical way the existing empirical evidence
and prospects. It also aims at providing the reader with
a self-consistent view of what is criticality and what it
is not, as well as an overview of the literature on this
active and fascinating research field with countless ram-
ifications.
Let us remark that there exist excellent articles re-
viewing some of these topics to different extents; the list
includes the very influential paper by Mora and Bialek
(2011) which popularized the subject, and other focused
on neural dynamics (Beggs, 2008; Chialvo, 2010; Chialvo
et al., 2008; Cocchi et al., 2017; Hesse and Gross, 2014;
Massobrio et al., 2015; Plenz and Niebur, 2014; Shew and
Plenz, 2013), gene networks (Roli et al., 2015), and col-
lective motion (Vicsek and Zafeiris, 2012), respectively.
The present paper aims at overviewing and complement-
ing them, putting the emphasis on dynamical aspects,
and discussing together empirical evidence and theoreti-
cal approaches.
II. CRITICALITY AND SCALE INVARIANCE
Many discussions about “criticality” are semantic ones.
Depending on authors and fields rather diverse contents
are assigned to terms such as “critical”, “quasi-critical”,
“dynamically critical”, “generically critical”, or “self-
organized critical”. Given the broad audience this paper
is aimed at, we esteem that a section devoted to present
a synthetic overview of basic concepts and to fix ideas
and notation is necessary.4 Readers familiar with these
concepts can skip it.
4 For a more exhaustive introduction to critical phenomena we
refer to the standard literature; e.g. Binney et al. (1993); Chris-
tensen and Moloney (2005); Henkel et al. (2008); Marro and
Dickman (1999); Sethna (2006); and Stanley (1987).
41. Scale-invariance and power laws
In a seminal paper entitled “Problems in Physics with
many scales of length” K. Wilson emphasized that “one
of the more conspicuous properties of nature is the great
diversity of size or length scales”, and cited oceans as
an example where phenomena at vastly disparate wave-
lengths coexist (Wilson, 1979). Different scales are usu-
ally decoupled and the “physics” at each one can be sep-
arately studied. However, there are situations –known as
scale-invariant or scale-free– where broadly diverse scales
make contributions of equal importance. A remarkable
instance of this –but just an example– are the critical
points of continuous phase transitions where the micro-
scopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic scales are all alike.
Power-law (or Pareto) distributions such as P (x) =
Ax−α, where α is a positive real number and A a normal-
ization constant, are the statistical trademark of scale-
invariance or “scaling”5. Actually, they are the only
probability distribution functions for which a change
of scale from x to Λx, for some constant Λ, leaves
the functional form of P (x) unaltered, i.e. P (Λx) =
A(Λx)α = AΛαxα = ΛαP (x), in such a way that the
ratio P (Λx)/P (x) = Λ−α does not depend on the vari-
able x, i.e. it is scale invariant (Newman, 2005; Sornette,
2006). As opposed to e.g. exponential distributions,
power-laws lack a relevant characteristic scale, besides
natural cut-offs.
Distributions with power-law tails appear in countless
scenarios, including the statistics of earthquakes, solar
flares, epidemic outbreaks, etc. (Mandelbrot, 1983; New-
man, 2005; Sornette, 2006; West, 2017). They are also
a common theme in biology (Gisiger, 2001; Goldberger,
1992; Goldberger et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2012; West,
2010). For example, physiological and clinical time-series
data have typically a spectrum that decays as a power
of the frequency (Mandelbrot, 2002) and mobility pat-
terns often exhibit scale-free features (Barabasi, 2005;
Brockmann et al., 2006; Proekt et al., 2012). Moreover,
a number of commonly-observed statistical patterns of
natural-world data –such as Zipf’s law6,7 (Baek et al.,
5 A well-known example is the Guttenberg-Richter equation for the
probability distribution of observing an earthquake of dissipated
energy E, P (E) ∝ E−α, (Corral, 2004).
6 This states that the frequency with which a given pattern is
observed declines as a negative power law of its rank, i.e. its
position in the list of possible patterns ordered from the most
frequent to the rarest one (Zipf, 1949).
7 A very elegant and illuminating approach allowed Mora and
Bialek to map the Zipf’s law to underlying statistical critical-
ity in a very precise way (Mora and Bialek, 2011). Within this
setting, it was observed, however, that the Zipf’s law (and its
concomitant statistical criticality) may emerge rather generically
if there is a fluctuating unobserved (hidden) variable that affects
the system, such as e.g a common input, even in systems not
tuned to criticality (Aitchison et al., 2016; Schwab et al., 2014);
FIG. 1 Random walks, such as the one illustrated in the left
panel, lack a characteristic scale. As a consequence, the distri-
bution of return times to the origin, T , of the one-dimensional
(unbiased) random walk obeys P (T ) ∼ T−α with α = 3/2 and
the areas/sizes, S, covered by their excursions before return-
ing to the origin (i.e. “avalanches”) obey P (S) ∼ S−τ with
τ = 4/3 (right panels) (Redner, 2001; di Santo et al., 2017b).
Some biological systems exhibit scaling as a consequence of
an underlying random-walk process; see e.g. Berg (1993) and
Gerstein and Mandelbrot (1964).
2011; Marsili and Zhang, 1998; Mora and Bialek, 2011;
Sornette, 2006; Visser, 2013), Bendford’s law (Benford,
1938; Pietronero et al., 2001), and Taylor’s law (Cohen
et al., 2012; Giometto et al., 2015; Taylor, 1961)– stem
from underlying power-law distributions.
Disputes on the validity and possible significance
of power-laws have a long history in diverse research
fields. For some authors they reveal fundamental mech-
anisms, while some others perceive them as largely un-
informative (Kello et al., 2010; Stumpf and Porter, 2012)
or even “more-normal-than-normal” distributions (Will-
inger et al., 2004). Still, in some cases, there is very ro-
bust evidence of scale invariance and it certainly provides
valuable insight8.
The detection and statistical characterization of
power-law distributions in real-world data is often hin-
dered by sampling problems since very rare but large
events control the statistics. Accordingly, the quality of
power-law fits to empirical data has been recently scru-
tinized, showing that many claims of scale-invariance ac-
tually lack statistical significance and, presently, more
stringent statistical tests have become a must (Clauset
et al., 2009).
see also Tkacˇik et al. (2015) for a discussion of these issues and
how can they influence the conclusions about statistical critical-
ity of empirical data.
8 An important example are allometric scaling laws, which
are power-law relationships between different measures of
anatomy/physiology (Banavar et al., 2014, 2010b; Kleiber, 1932;
West et al., 1997). These have been elegantly shown to stem
from the constraint that living systems have an underlying opti-
mal (e.g nutrient) transportation network (Banavar et al., 1999;
Simini et al., 2010).
5From the mathematical side, very diverse explanatory
mechanisms for the emergence of scaling in empirical
data have been put forward (Markovic´ and Gros, 2014;
Mitzenmacher, 2002; Newman, 2005; Simkin and Roy-
chowdhury, 2011; Sornette, 2009). For example, ran-
dom walks give rise to power laws in the distribution
of return times and “avalanche” sizes as illustrated in
Fig.1. Other examples are: (i) Underlying multiplica-
tive processes (Reed and Hughes, 2002; Richmond and
Solomon, 2001; Sornette, 1998; Sornette and Cont, 1997),
(ii) Preferential attachment processes (Baraba´si and Al-
bert, 1999; Simon, 1955; Yule, 1925). (iii) Optimization
and constrained optimization (Carlson and Doyle, 2000;
Seoane and Sole´, 2015).
Even if –as the previous enumeration illustrates– em-
pirical power-law distributions can in principle be as-
cribed to a handful of possible different generative mech-
anisms, in the forthcoming sections we discuss the most
prominent and general mechanism, able to account for
scale invariance both in space and time in a rather ro-
bust, powerful, and universal way: criticality.
2. Criticality in equilibrium systems and beyond
The concept of criticality was born in the context
of systems at thermodynamic equilibrium. A paradig-
matic example are ferromagnets. These exhibit a
continuous/second-order phase transition at a critical
temperature, Tc, below which the orientational sym-
metry of spins is spontaneously broken –i.e. a pre-
ferred direction emerges– and, progressively, more or-
dered/magnetized states emerge as the temperature is
lowered. On the other hand, above Tc thermal fluctua-
tions dominate and the system remains disordered. This
change in the collective state is usually encoded in an
order parameter (e.g. the overall magnetization) which
measures the degree of order as the phase transition pro-
ceeds.
The described symmetry-breaking is a collective phe-
nomenon that requires a system-wide coordination for
the global re-organization to emerge. This implies
that the correlation length among individual components
needs to span the whole systems at criticality. Similarly,
when the system is becoming incipiently ordered, it is
highly fluctuating in the orientation to be chosen. For
example, classical experiment with liquid-gas transitions
(e.g. with CO2) shows that, right at criticality, light of
many different wavelengths scatters with internal struc-
tures of the mixture (i.e. there are density fluctuations
of all possible length scales), causing the normally trans-
parent liquid to appear cloudy in a phenomenon called
critical opalescence (Binney et al., 1993; Stanley, 1987).
Importantly, the concepts and methods developed
in the context of equilibrium systems were soon ex-
tended to time-dependent and non-equilibrium problems
(Henkel et al., 2008; Hinrichsen, 2000; Hohenberg and
Halperin, 1977; Kamenev, 2011; Marro and Dickman,
1999; Ta¨uber, 2014, 2017). All along this paper, we adopt
a view of criticality and phase transitions focused mostly
on dynamical and non-equilibrium aspects. This seems
to be the most natural choice to analyze living systems,
which are dynamical entities kept away from thermal
equilibrium by permanently exchanging energy and mat-
ter with their surroundings. It is important to underline
that there exists an important alternative “statistical-
criticality” approach to the analysis of biological data. It
focuses on the statistics of existing configurations (with-
out regard to the temporal order in which they appear,
much as in equilibrium statistical mechanics) rather than
on possible underlying dynamical processes, and it is only
briefly discussed here where, as said above, we choose to
focus on dynamical aspects.
3. Non-equilibrium phase transitions: an example
In order to turn the foregoing wordy explanations into
a more formal approach, we describe in detail –as a
guiding example– one of the simplest possible dynam-
ical models exhibiting a non-equilibrium phase transi-
tion. The contact process (CP) is a prototypical toy
model to study the dynamics of propagation of some
type of “activity” (as e.g. infections in epidemic spread-
ing; see Fig.2) (Harris, 2002; Henkel et al., 2008; Hin-
richsen, 2000; Marro and Dickman, 1999). At any given
time, each of the nodes i = 1, 2...N of a given network
(which in particular can be a lattice, a fully connected
network, or one with a more complex architecture, de-
scribing the pattern of connections among units/nodes)
is in a state si that can be either occupied/active (si = 1)
or empty/quiescent (si = 0). Occupied sites are emp-
tied at rate µ = 1 and new active nodes are created
at (empty) randomly-selected nearest neighbors of active
ones at rate λ. Considering, for the sake of simplicity, a
fully connected network with N nodes and performing a
large-N expansion of the corresponding Master equation
(Van Kampen, 1992), one readily obtains a “mean-field”
or deterministic equation:
ρ˙(t) = λρ(t)(1− ρ(t))− ρ(t) = (λ− 1)ρ(t)− λρ2(t) (1)
where the dot stands for time derivative of the activ-
ity density ρ =
∑N
i=1 si/N . This simple one-variable
approximation already illustrates some of the essential
features of criticality. Eq.(1) reveals the presence of a
bifurcation at a value λc = 1, separating a subcritical
(also called “absorbing” or “quiescent”) phase (λ < 1)
in which transient activity decays to the only possible
steady-state, ρst = 0, from a supercritical (or “active”)
one (λ > 1) with a sustained activity ρst = 1− 1/λ (see
Fig.2). Thus, defining δ = |λ − 1| as the distance to
6FIG. 2 Sketch of the main aspects of the contact process.
(A) Dynamical rules. (B) Phase diagram, including a critical
point. (C) Temporal raster plots of activity (avalanches) in
the different regimes, illustrating the complex patterns emerg-
ing at criticality, which involve many different scales. (D)
Avalanche size distributions in the different phases (main)
and, right at the critical point for different system sizes (in-
set), illustrating finite-size scaling, i.e. the emergence at crit-
icality, of a straight line in a double-logarithmic plot, as cor-
responds to scale invariance (see also Fig.3).
criticality, ρst ∼ δ for small δ. In the quiescent (or ab-
sorbing) phase9, an initial density decays exponentially,
ρ(t) = ρ(0) exp(−δt), implying that there is a character-
istic time scale proportional to δ−1. Note that such time
diverges at criticality, i.e. it takes a huge time for the sys-
tem to “forget” its initial state, reflecting a generic fea-
ture of criticality: the so-called “critical slowing down”.
Indeed, right at the critical point, the activity decays
asymptotically as a power-law, ρ(t) ∼ t−1.
Introducing an external field that creates activity at
empty sites at rate h, the overall response or “suscepti-
bility”, defined as Ξ = ∂ρst∂h |h→0, is Ξ ∝ δ−1 that, again,
diverges right at δ = 0, (i.e. λ = 1), illustrating the di-
verging response to infinitesimal perturbations, another
important generic feature of criticality.
A useful tool to analyze this type of transitions con-
sists in performing “spreading experiments” in which the
evolution of a single localized seed of activity in an other-
wise absorbing/quiescent state is monitored (see Fig.2C).
In this case, given the small number of active sites,
the dynamics is chiefly driven by fluctuations and can-
not be analyzed within the deterministic approximation
above. Stochastic cascades of spatio-temporal activity,
or “avalanches” of variable sizes and durations can be
generated from the initial seed before the system returns
to the quiescent state (extinction). In this framework the
critical point separates a regime of sure extinction (ab-
sorbing phase) from one of non-sure extinction (active
phase). Right at the critical point, the sizes and dura-
tions of avalanches are distributed as power-laws with
anomalously large (formally infinite) variance (Fig.2C)
10. To understand this mathematically, one needs the
next-to-leading correction to Eq.(1) in the large-N ex-
pansion to include the effect of “demographic” fluctua-
tions. This leads to an additional term +
√
ρη(t), where
η(t) is a Gaussian white noise of variance σ2 = (λ+1)/N .
11
A simple analysis of the resulting stochastic equation12
shows that right at the critical point, the time required to
return to the quiescent state, i.e. the avalanche-durations
T are distributed as power laws: F (T ) ∼ T−α with
α = 2; similarly, avalanches sizes s obey P (S) ∼ S−τ ,
with τ = 3/2 These mean-field exponents coincide with
those of the (Galton-Watson) unbiased branching pro-
cess (Harris, 2002; Liggett, 2004; Watson and Galton,
1875), introduced to describe the statistics of family-
names, and often employed to illustrate the statistics of
9 A similar argument holds in the active phase.
10 The large variability of possible patterns is a generic key feature
of criticality. In particular, in systems at equilibrium, the diver-
gence at criticality of the specific heat reflects the huge variability
of possible internal states (Binney et al., 1993).
11 The square-root noise stems from the central limit theorem
(Van Kampen, 1992).
12 See di Santo et al. (2017b) for a pedagogical derivation of this.
7critical avalanches. Away from criticality, as well as in
finite systems, cut-offs appear in the avalanche distribu-
tions (see Fig.2). In particular, as a reflection of the
underlying scale-invariance at criticality, the finite-size
cut-offs obey scaling laws such as
P (S,N) ∼ S−τG(S/N) (2)
where the power-law S−τ is cut-off by an unspecified
function, G, at an N -dependent scale (Binder, 1981; Bin-
ney et al., 1993; Stanley, 1987). This enforces that plot-
ting P (S,N)Sτ as a function of the rescaled variable
S/N should give a unique curve into which all individual
curves for different sizes N collapse. This finite-size scal-
ing method constitutes an important tool for analyzing
critical phenomena (both in computer simulations and in
experiments) as perfect power-laws/divergences can only
appear in the infinite-size limit, not reachable in biolog-
ical problems. Indeed, while in finite systems true criti-
cality does not exist, still, these may exhibit a progressive
transition between order and disorder. This can be char-
acterized by the existence of a peak in some quantity such
as the susceptibility or the correlation length that usu-
ally diverge at (true) criticality; this is used as a proxy
for “approximate” criticality in finite systems13.
As a result of universality, all models exhibiting a phase
transition to an absorbing/quiescent phase (without any
additional symmetry or conservation law) share the same
set of critical exponents and scaling functions –i.e. the
same type of scale-invariant organization– with the con-
tact process (Henkel et al., 2008)14
Even if the simple propagation model discussed above
is not intended as a faithful description of the actual dy-
namics of any specific biological system, in some cases
–such as neural and gene regulatory networks– it can con-
stitute an adequate effective representation of “damage
spreading” experiments, in which two identical replicas
of the same system are considered; a localized perturba-
tion in the state of one unit/node is introduced in one of
the two, and the difference between both replicas is mon-
itored as a function of time (Derrida and Pomeau, 1986).
Depending on the the system dynamical state, such per-
turbations may grow (active phase), shrink (quiescent
phase), or fluctuate marginally (critical point), provid-
ing a practical tool to gauge the level of internal order15.
13 Similarly, systems in the presence of an external driving force
are not truly critical; in these cases, the Widom line –signaling
e.g. the position of maximal susceptibility or correlation– can be
taken as a surrogate of criticality (Williams-Garc´ıa et al., 2014).
14 To study spatial effects one needs to replace ρ(t) in Eq.(1) by a
field ρ(x, t) and to introduce a diffusive coupling term (Henkel
et al., 2008; Hinrichsen, 2000; O´dor, 2008).
15 The precise relationship between the damage spreading threshold
and the system’s actual critical point is an important and subtle
issue (Coniglio et al., 1989; Grassberger, 1995; Hinrichsen and
Domany, 1997).
Even if the actual dynamics might be much more com-
plicated, the resulting damage spreading process is sus-
ceptible to be described in simple terms if local effective
error “propagation” and error “healing” rates can be es-
timated.
4. Self-organization to criticality
As we have seen criticality requires of parameter fine
tuning to a precise point to be observed. How it
is possible that natural systems (such as earthquakes,
Barkhaussen noise, etc.) exhibit signatures of critical-
ity, but without any apparent need for parameter tun-
ing to settle them in at the edge of a phase transition?
To answer this question P. Bak and collaborators in-
troduced the important concept of “self-organized crit-
icality” (SOC) through a series of archetypical models
(Bak, 1996; Bak et al., 1990; Bak and Tang, 1989; Cor-
ral et al., 1995; Dhar, 1999; Drossel and Schwabl, 1992;
Frette et al., 1996; Olami et al., 1992), including its most
famous representative: the sandpile model (Bak et al.,
1987).
In the sandpile model a type of “stress” or “energy”
(sandgrains) accumulates at a slow timescale at the sites
of a (two-dimensional) lattice, and when the accumulated
stress overcomes a local instability threshold, it is in-
stantaneously redistributed among nearest neighbor sites
–and, possibly, released/dissipated at the system bound-
aries. This can create a cascade or “avalanche” of fur-
ther instabilities. Remarkably, the durations and sizes
of such avalanches turn out to be distributed as power
laws, i.e. the system becomes critical without any appar-
ent need for fine tuning16 (Bak, 1996; Bak et al., 1987;
Christensen and Moloney, 2005; Dickman et al., 2000;
Jensen, 1998; Pruessner, 2012; Turcotte, 1999; Watkins
et al., 2015). The mechanism for self-organization to crit-
icality in sandpile models is described in Fig.3. It can
be seen that it is characterized by a dynamical feedback
that acts differentially depending on the actual system
state. This is just an example of a broader class that
has been extensively analyzed in the context of control
theory (Magnasco et al., 2009; Moreau and Sontag, 2003;
di Santo et al., 2016; Sornette, 1994), which is very likely
to emerge in biological systems, as we shall discuss. Two
important variants of this mechanism are as follows:
(a) Self-organized quasi-criticality is analogous to SOC
but occurs when the dynamics is non-conservative and/or
when the separation of timescales is not perfect (relevant
for biological problems). This self-organization mecha-
nism drags the system back and forth around the critical
16 Stochastic variants of the original (deterministic) sandpile model
(Christensen et al., 1996; Manna, 1991) show much cleaner scal-
ing behavior than it (Bagnoli et al., 2003; Ktitarev et al., 2000).
8FIG. 3 The self-organization-to-criticality (SOC) mechanism
works by establishing a feedback loop between the dynamics
of the activity and that of the control-parameter (total ac-
cumulated energy/stress/sandgrains) at separated timescales.
In particular, the control parameter itself becomes a dynami-
cal variable that operates in opposite ways depending on the
system’s state: fast dissipation (negative force) dominates
while the control parameter lies within the active phase and
by slow driving dynamics (positive force) dominates in the
absorbing/quiescent phase. This feedback self-organizes the
system to the critical point of its second-order phase tran-
sition if the separation between slow and fast timescales is
infinitely large and the dynamics is conservative (Bonachela
and Mun˜oz, 2009; Vespignani et al., 1998, 2000; Zapperi et al.,
1995; ?). Otherwise, the system is just self-organized to the
neighborhood of the critical point with excursions around it,
i.e. “self-organized quasi-criticality” (Bonachela and Mun˜oz,
2009; Dickman et al., 2000).
point without sitting exactly at it, and is able to gen-
erate effective scale-invariance across quite a few scales
(Bonachela and Mun˜oz, 2009; Kinouchi et al., 2018).
(b) Adaptive criticality is a variant of SOC from a
network perspective, in which connections among nodes
in a network are susceptible to be added, removed, or
rewired depending on the system’s dynamical state, cre-
ating a feedback loop between network architecture and
dynamics in a sort of co-adaptive process.17 This mecha-
nism can drive the dynamics to criticality (Bianconi and
Marsili, 2004; Dorogovtsev et al., 2008; Liu and Bassler,
2006) and, in parallel, the network architecture devel-
ops a highly non-random structure, thus capturing the
feedback between dynamics and architecture in actual
biological networks.
17 Different variants of this idea have been proposed in the litera-
ture (Bornholdt and Rohlf, 2000; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002;
Droste et al., 2013; Gros, 2008; Gross and Blasius, 2008; Kuehn,
2012; MacArthur et al., 2010; Meisel and Gross, 2009; Perotti
et al., 2009; Rohlf, 2008; Rybarsch and Bornholdt, 2014; Saito
and Kikuchi, 2013; Sole´ et al., 2002b).
5. Classes of criticality
Not all dynamical phase transitions of relevance in bi-
ology occur between quiescent and active phases, nor can
be described by an associated activity-propagation pro-
cess, such as the contact process. Other important classes
of phase transitions to be found across this paper are:
(i) synchronization transitions, at which coherent behav-
ior of oscillators emerges, as described by the prototyp-
ical Kuramoto model (Acebro´n et al., 2005; Kuramoto,
1975; Pikovsky et al., 2003). (ii) transitions to collec-
tive ordered motion, as represented for instance by the
Vicsek model (Vicsek et al., 1995; Vicsek and Zafeiris,
2012)) and its variants; and (iii) percolation transitions
(Christensen and Moloney, 2005), and (iv) even (ther-
modynamic) transitions such as that of the Ising model
(Binney et al., 1993), to name but a few. Each of these
classes has its own type of emerging ordering and its own
scaling features. However, all of them share the basic fea-
tures that constitute the fingerprints of criticality, such
as diverging correlations and response, large variability,
scale invariance, etc.
6. Criticality on complex networks
Thus far we have discussed criticality in homogeneous
systems. However, in many biological problems the sub-
strates on top of which dynamical processes run are
highly heterogeneous (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002; Cal-
darelli, 2007; Newman, 2003, 2010). In particular, com-
plex systems, including biological ones, can be described
as networks, where nodes represent units (neurons, genes,
proteins, ...) and links stand for allowed pairwise inter-
actions among them. Such complex networks have been
found to exhibit one or more of the following important
architectural features: (i) large heterogeneity with a few
highly connected nodes and many loosely connected ones;
actually the distribution of connection can be scale free
(Baraba´si and Albert, 1999), (ii) the small-world prop-
erty (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), (iii) modular organiza-
tion18, (iv) hierarchical organization, etc. (Corominas-
Murtra et al., 2013). These structural features usually
entail profound implications on the dynamics of processes
running on top of them (Barrat et al., 2008; Boccaletti
et al., 2006; Dorogovtsev et al., 2008; Pastor-Satorras
et al., 2015). For instance, synchronization transitions
proceed in a stepped way on modular networks (Arenas
et al., 2008), and broad critical-like phases can emerge
in hierarchical modular networks (as discussed e.g. in
18 Biology is “modular” in many aspects (Alon, 2006; Ravasz et al.,
2002), meaning that some components in biological networks
(nodes) are connected among themselves more often or more
strongly that they do with others (Alon, 2003).
9Moretti and Mun˜oz (2013) and Mun˜oz et al. (2010), Ap-
pendix A and in what follows).
7. Generic scale invariance
We have discussed the paradigm of a critical point –
with its concomitant spatio-temporal scale-invariance–
separating two alternative phases. However, in some
systems with peculiar symmetries, conservation laws or
structural disorder, critical-like features may appear in
extended regions in the phase space and not just at a crit-
ical point. This is called generic scale invariance (Grin-
stein, 1991) and can account for empirically reported
scale-invariance in some biological problems without the
need to invoke precise tuning to criticality. Mechanisms
for the emergence of generic scale invariance are discussed
in Appendix A.
8. Statistical criticality
To end this introductory section, we briefly discuss
an (already mentioned above) alternative perspective to
criticality, particularly useful to analyze the wealth of
high-quality data now available for living systems (Mora
and Bialek, 2011). It relies on the idea that some fun-
damental questions in biology can be tackled within a
probabilistic setting (for instance, analyzing the statis-
tics of spiking patterns may help deciphering the way in
which neurons encode information) (Rieke et al., 1995).
Bialek and coworkers developed a data-driven maximum
entropy (statistical physics) approach to biological prob-
lems, that consists in approximating the probability dis-
tribution of different patterns in a given dataset by a
probabilistic model that consistently reproduces its main
statistical features (e.g. mean values and pairwise cor-
relations; see Appendix B). The resulting models are
akin to the Ising models.19 Rather remarkably, Bialek
and collaborators observed that the emerging probabilis-
tic models for a number of high-dimensional problems –
including biological ones, from retinal neural populations
(Schneidman et al., 2006; Tkacˇik et al., 2014, 2013, 2015)
to flocks of birds (Bialek et al., 2012) and the immune
system (Mora et al., 2010), for which excellent empiri-
cal data sets are available– have parameter values sitting
close to the edge of a phase transition, i.e the emerging
probabilistic models seem to be critical in a very precise
sense (Mora and Bialek, 2011) (see Appendix B).
19 And since the inferred interactions among “spins” have both
signs, they are a sort of spin glasses (Tkacˇik et al., 2013; Tkacik
et al., 2009).
III. FUNCTIONAL ADVANTAGES OF CRITICALITY
Having discussed basic aspects of criticality and scale
invariance, we move on to ask: what are the poten-
tial virtues of them susceptible to be exploited by liv-
ing systems to enhance their functionality? To shed
light onto this, we first describe a well-understood case
in which both theoretical and empirical evidence match,
and where the essential and beneficial role played by crit-
icality in a biological system is clear and illuminating.
Later on we discuss a set of possible functional advan-
tages of criticality from a general perspective.
A. Criticality in the auditory and other sensory systems
The inner ear of vertebrates is able to detect acoustic
stimuli with extraordinary sensitivity and exquisite fre-
quency selectivity across many scales (Hudspeth, 2014).
At the basis of these exceptional features there are hair
cells, the ear’s sensory receptors, which oscillate spon-
taneously even in the absence of stimuli, being able to
resonate with acoustic inputs (Choe et al., 1998; Gold,
1948; Martin et al., 2001). Intrinsic oscillations are either
damped or self-sustained depending on the concentration
of Calcium ions, with a Hopf bifurcation separating these
two regimes. Empirical evidence reveals that the ion con-
centration is regulated in such a way that hair cells op-
erate in a regime very close to the Hopf bifurcation (Ca-
malet et al., 2000; Ospeck et al., 2001). This has been
argued to entail important consequences for signal pro-
cessing (Choe et al., 1998; Egu´ıluz et al., 2000; Hudspeth
et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2001), as we discuss now.
In the simplest possible setting, a hair cell can be ef-
fectively described as Hopf oscillator (Strogatz, 2014):
φ˙(t) = (a+ iω˜)φ(t)− |φ|2φ(t) (3)
where the φ is a complex number, ω˜ the resonance fre-
quency, and a is the control parameter (ion concentra-
tion) setting the dynamical regime. Eq.(3) exhibits self-
sustained oscillations of the form φ(t) =
√
aeiω˜t if a > 0,
while if a < 0 oscillations are damped.20 Introducing
stimuli of the characteristic frequency ω = ω˜ and small
amplitude F (i.e. adding +Feiω˜t to Eq.(3)), and writing
φ(t) = R(t)eiωt, one finds
R˙(t) = R(t)[a−R2(t)] + F. (4)
In the oscillatory regime, a > 0, the response R is pro-
portional to the input amplitude F . However, at the
bifurcation (or critical) point, a = 0, the response R is
strongly non-linear, as R = F 1/3 and, consequently, the
20 See Kern and Stoop (2003) from where this discussion is adapted.
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ratio response-to-signal R/F = F−2/3 diverges at F → 0,
leading to a huge response to tiny signals of the character-
istic frequency. On the other hand, if the input has some
other frequency ω 6= ω˜ the response is much smaller. This
entails an extremely efficient frequency-selection and am-
plification mechanism, vividly illustrating the advantage
of working close to the instability point.
The described phenomenon involves a single hair-cell
with a specific intrinsic frequency and it is thus not a
collective critical phenomenon. However, the Cochlea
is arranged in such a way that it involves an (almost
uni-dimensional) array of diverse and coupled hair cells.
When coupling many different Hopf oscillators results in
the emergence of a true phase transition –i.e. a critical
point with scale-free avalanches– which entails sharpened
frequency response (Duke and Ju¨licher, 2003; Magnasco,
2003) and enhanced input sensitivity (Gomez et al., 2015;
Kern and Stoop, 2003; Stoop and Gomez, 2016).
Summing up, woking at criticality has been shown to
be essential to generate the extraordinary features of ver-
tebrate hearing, even the most intricate ones (Stoop and
Gomez, 2016). Similar virtues of criticality have been ex-
plored in the olfactory system (Bushdid et al., 2014) and
the visual cortex (Shew et al., 2015) (see also Chialvo
(2006) and Friston et al. (2012)).
B. Exploiting criticality
1. Maximal sensitivity and dynamic range
As discussed above, an important trademark of critical
points is the divergence of the response (or susceptibil-
ity) which is likely to be exploited in biological sensing
systems, needing to optimize their response to environ-
mental cues. To better quantify this, a related quantity,
dubbed dynamic range, was introduced in Kinouchi and
Copelli (2006). Consider a model for activity propaga-
tion (similar to the contact process) with a critical point
(λc = 1) running on a random network, under the ac-
tion of an external stimulus, h, able to create activity at
empty nodes. The dynamic range, ∆ (see Fig.4) gauges
the range of diverse stimuli intensities where variations
in input h can be robustly coded by variations in the re-
sponse, discarding stimuli that give almost indistinguish-
able outputs. ∆ turns out to exhibit a marked peak at
λc = 1, indicating that, at criticality, discriminative out-
puts can be associated to a very large variety of inputs,
with obvious functional advantages for signal detection
and processing.
2. Large correlations
The emergence of arbitrarily large correlation lengths
at criticality is an important feature susceptible to be
ρ
log(h) λ
Δ
Δ
FIG. 4 Sketch of the behavior of the dynamic range, defined
as , near a critical point. (Left) Steady state density ρ as a
function of the driving force h (in log scale) for a given value
of the control parameter λ; the dynamic range, ∆, defined as
∆ = 10 log[h(ρ = 0.9)/h(ρ = 0.1)], signals the interval where
distinguishable responses (i.e. values of ρ) can be measured.
(Right) ∆ exhibits a pronounced peak at criticality.
exploited by living systems in order to induce coordi-
nated behavior of individual units across space and time.
This can be relevant for coordination purposes in e.g.
neural systems where coherent behavior across extended
areas is observed (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012), in flocks
of birds (Cavagna et al., 2010) and in micro-organism
colonies (De Palo et al., 2017). Similarly, the emergence
of very large correlation times and critical slowing down
may provide biological systems with a useful mechanism
for the generation of long-lasting and/or slow-decaying
memories at multiple timescales (see e.g. Deco and Jirsa
(2012)).
3. Statistical complexity and large repertoires
The variability of possible spatio-temporal patterns is
maximal at criticality (as illustrated in Fig.2); this may
allow biological systems to exhibit a very wide spectrum
of possible responses, sometimes called “dynamical reper-
toire” (Ra¨mo¨ et al., 2007, 2006; Yang et al., 2012). This
is consistent with the finding that e.g. models for brain
activity reach highest signal complexity, with a variety of
attractors and multistability when operating near criti-
cality (Deco and Jirsa, 2012; Haimovici et al., 2013). Sim-
ilarly, (i) the number of metastable states (Haldeman and
Beggs, 2005), (ii) the variability of attractors to support
memories (de Arcangelis and Herrmann, 2010; Krawitz
and Shmulevich, 2007), and (ii) the diversity in structure-
dynamics relationships (Nykter et al., 2008b) have been
predicted to be maximized at criticality. All this sug-
gests that in order to spontaneously generate complex
patterns –required e.g. to store highly diverse tokens of
information– operating near criticality can be an excel-
lent solution for living systems. As a consequence of this,
the capacity to store and process information is optimal
at criticality, as we discuss in more depth in what follows.
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4. Computation exploiting criticality
It was long-ago conjectured that the extraordinary
“computational power” of living systems could be the
result of collective behavior, emerging out of a large num-
ber of simple components (Amari, 1972; Carpenter and
Grossberg, 2016; Grossberg, 1982; Hopfield, 1982). By
“computation” it is usually meant an algorithm or sys-
tem that –with the aim of performing some task– assigns
outputs to inputs following some internal logic. Thus,
the computational power of a given device is quantified
by estimating the amount and diversity of associations
of inputs to outputs that it can support. As first sug-
gested in (Ashby, 1960; Turing, 1950) and much further
developed in the context of machine learning (Crutchfield
and Young, 1988; Langton, 1990; Li et al., 1990; Packard,
1988) networked systems operating at criticality can have
exceptionally high computational capabilities. In partic-
ular, Langton formulated the question: under what con-
ditions will physical systems support the basic operations
of information transmission, storage, and modification,
required to support computation?’ His answer was that
systems21 operating at the “edge of chaos” are especially
suitable to perform complex computations22. The “edge
of chaos” or critical point (as we rather call it here) is the
borderline between two distinct phases or regimes: the
chaotic/disordered one in which perturbations and noise
propagate unboundedly (thereby corrupting information
storage) and the frozen/ordered phase whereas changes
are rapidly erased (hindering the capacity to react and
transmit information). Therefore, the critical point con-
fers on computing devices composed of equivalent units
an optimal tradeoff between information storage and in-
formation transmission, two of the key ingredients pro-
posed by Turing as indispensable for universal computing
machines (Turing, 1950).
In artificial intelligence, criticality is exploited in so-
called “reservoir computing” (Lukosˇevicˇius et al., 2012)
that was developed independently in the fields of ma-
chine learning (“echo state networks” of Jaeger (2007))
and computational neuroscience (“liquid state machine”
in Maass et al. (2002)). These machines consist of a net-
work of nodes and links, “the reservoir”, where each node
represents an abstract “neuron” and links between them
mimic the connectivity of actual biological circuits. A
series of seminal works showed that such machines can
perform real-time computations –responding rapidly to
time varying input signals– in a coherent yet flexible way
if they operate near a critical point (Bertschinger and
Natschlager, 2004; Boedecker et al., 2012; Legenstein and
Maass, 2007; Legenstein, 2005; Maass et al., 2002).
21 Cellular automata in this case (Wolfram, 2002).
22 This proposal triggered a heated debate; see, e.g. (Crutchfield,
2012; Crutchfield and Young, 1988; Melanie, 1993).
These ideas are corroborated by information-theoretic
analyses (Cover and Thomas, 1991), which have un-
veiled that the overall transmission of information be-
tween units in a network –as measured by diverse indi-
cators23– is maximal if the underlying dynamical process
is critical24.
Let us also mention that (i) state-of-the-art deep learn-
ing machines (LeCun et al., 2015) may rely on some form
of intrinsic scale invariance or even criticality (Lin and
Tegmark, 2017; Mehta and Schwab, 2014; Oprisa and
Toth, 2017a,b; Ringel and de Bem, 2018; Song et al.,
2017), opening exciting research avenues to understand
how artificial-intelligence machines achieve their extraor-
dinary performance, and (ii) from the empirical side, re-
cent work has revealed that a mechanism akin to reservoir
computing enables neuronal networks of the cerebellum
to perform highly complex tasks in an efficient way by
operating at criticality (Ro¨ssert et al., 2015).
IV. ALLEGED CRITICALITY AND SCALING IN
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Having discussed putative virtues of critical dynam-
ics, susceptible in principle to be exploited by biological
systems, we now start a trip through some of the most-
remarkable existing empirical evidence revealing signa-
tures of criticality in such systems. We warn the reader
that –even if the aim is to present a collection as exten-
sive and exhaustive as possible– the selection of topics as
well as the extent in which they are discussed might be
biased by our own experience. Also, importantly, even
if some of the experiments and findings to be discussed
are very appealing, evidence in many cases is not com-
plete and conclusions should be always taken with cau-
tion. Indeed, for many of the forthcoming examples, we
also discuss existing criticisms and potential technical or
interpretative problems.
A. Neural activity and brain networks
1. Spontaneous cortical activity
The cerebral-cortex of mammalians is never silent, not
even under resting conditions nor in the absence of stim-
uli; instead, it exhibits a state of ceaseless spontaneous
23 Such as the transfer entropy (Lizier et al., 2008b; Shriki and
Yellin, 2016; Sole´ and Miramontes, 1995), Fisher information
(Wang et al., 2011) and, more in general, statistical complex-
ity (as discussed above) (Krawitz and Shmulevich, 2007; Lizier
et al., 2008a; Ra¨mo¨ et al., 2007).
24 See Beggs (2008); Li et al. (1990); Luque and Ferrera (2000);
Prokopenko (2013); and Ribeiro et al. (2008); and Barnett et al.
(2013) and Toyoizumi and Abbott (2011) for a discrepant view.
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electro-chemical activity with very high variability and
sensitivity(Arieli et al., 1996; Fox and Raichle, 2007;
Raichle, 2011; Yuste et al., 2005). Understanding the
genesis and functionality of spontaneous cortical activ-
ity – which accounts for about 20% of the total oxygen
consumption of a person at rest– is key to shedding light
onto how the cortex processes information and computes
(Arieli et al., 1996; Deco et al., 2011, 2013a; He, 2014).
Criticality might play a key role to generate such a vari-
able and sensitive activity as diverse empirical results
suggest.
An adult human brain consists of almost 1011 neurons
and up to 1015 synaptic connections among them, form-
ing an amazingly complex network through which electric
signals propagate (Keenan et al., 2007). Neurons inte-
grate presynaptic excitatory and inhibitory inputs from
other neurons, and fire an action potential when a given
threshold is overcome, stimulating further activity. This
generates irregular cascades or outbursts of activity in-
terspersed by quiescent periods, as empirically observed
both in vitro (Eytan and Marom, 2006; Sanchez-Vives
and McCormick, 2000; Segev and Ben-Jacob, 2001; Segev
et al., 2001; Tabak and Latham, 2003) and in vivo (Meis-
ter et al., 1991; Steriade et al., 1993) (see Fig.5). Is this
activity related to inherent critical behavior? In what
follows we discuss empirical pieces of evidence suggest-
ing diverse possible connections with different types of
phase transitions.
2. The edge of activity propagation: avalanches
In a remarkable breakthrough, Beggs and Plenz (2003)
succeeded at resolving the internal spatio temporal orga-
nization of the above-mentioned outbursts of neuronal
activity. They analyzed mature cultures as well as acute
slices of rat cortex, and recorded spontaneous local field
potentials (LFP) –which provide coarse-grained measure-
ments of electrochemical activity– at different locations
and times. Local events of activity are defined as (neg-
ative) peaks of the LFP signals, which are indicative of
local population spikes (Beggs and Plenz, 2003). As illus-
trated in Fig.5, events at different sites have a tendency
to cluster in time, producing network spikes of activity.
Each of these outbursts of activity when temporally re-
solved, consists in a cascade of succesive local events,
organized as neuronal avalanches interspersed by peri-
ods of quiescence (Beggs and Plenz, 2003, 2004). The
avalanche sizes (i.e. number of local events each one in-
cludes) and durations were found to be distributed as
power-laws with exponents τ ≈ 3/2 and α ≈ 2, respec-
tively, with cut-offs that increase with system size in a
scale-invariant way (i.e. the distributions obey finite-size
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FIG. 5 Sketch illustrating how neuronal avalanches are mea-
sured from Local field potential (LFP). (Top) LFPs are mea-
sured at different locations; negative peaks of the time series
correlate with large population spikes of the underlying neu-
rons within each local region. (Middle) Raster plot illustrat-
ing the times at which peaks of the LPF occurs for different
sites, revealing a high degree of temporal clustering. (Bottom)
Enhancing the temporal resolution, it is possible to resolve
the spatio-temporal organization within apparently coherent
large-scale events; is occurs occur in the form of “neuronal
avalanches” (shaded columns) interspersed by periods of qui-
escence (white columns).
scaling25; see Beggs and Plenz (2003); Mazzoni et al.
(2007); and Petermann et al. (2009)). The observed
exponents coincide with those of the (mean-field) criti-
cal contact/branching processes as described above and,
thus, seem to describe a marginal activity-propagation
process. Moreover, the mean temporal profile of neuronal
avalanches of widely varying durations is quantitatively
described by a single universal scaling function (Fried-
man et al., 2012; Sethna et al., 2001), and scaling rela-
tionships between the measured exponents are fulfilled
(Friedman et al., 2012). Similar avalanches have been
observed in vitro (Mazzoni et al., 2007; Pasquale et al.,
2008) and in vivo for different species (Gireesh and Plenz,
2008; Hahn et al., 2010; Petermann et al., 2009; Ribeiro
et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2011) and across resolution scales,
from single neuron spikes to rather coarse-grained mea-
surements.26 The fact that at quite different resolution
25 Instead, if data are temporally reshuffled the distributions be-
come exponential ones, meaning that large coherent events dis-
appear (Beggs and Plenz, 2003; Plenz and Thiagarajan, 2007).
26 This includes single unit recordings (Bellay et al., 2015), lo-
cal field potentials (LFP) (Beggs and Plenz, 2003; Petermann
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scales similar results are reported is, by itself, strongly
supportive of the existence of underlying scale-invariant
dynamical processes.27
All this evidence regarding neuronal avalanches seems
to make a strong case in favor of criticality. However,
some caveats need to be made:
(i) Thresholding: A source of ambiguities in extracting
(discrete) events from (continuous) time-series analyses
comes from thresholding; i.e. signals at any given spatio-
temporal location need to overcome some threshold to be
declared an “event”of activity. Petermann et al. (2009)
compared results for different thresholds in LFPs time se-
ries and found that exponent values remain unchanged,
suggesting the existence of a truly scale-invariant orga-
nization of events. However, a word of caution is still re-
quired as recent works have underlined the “perils” asso-
ciated with thresholding, which in some controlled cases
has been shown to generate spurious effects such as ef-
fective exponent values and correlations in the timings of
consecutive avalanches (Font-Clos et al., 2015; Janic´evic´
et al., 2016; Laurson et al., 2009). Further clarifying this
issue is key to make solid progress in the empirical anal-
ysis of avalanching systems.
(ii) Time binning: Avalanches can only be defined
by employing a criterion to establish when an avalanche
starts and when it ends. This requires setting a discrete
time binning to be applied to the data: an avalanche
starts when a time-bin with some activity within it fol-
lows a series of preceding consecutive quiescent ones, and
ends when a new quiescent time-bin appears (Beggs and
Plenz, 2003) (see Fig.5). This introduces some ambi-
guity, and the measured avalanche exponents have been
shown to be sensitive to the choice of the time-bin. How-
ever, taking the time bin to coincide with the mean inter-
event interval, the mean-field branching process expo-
nents seem to be systematically recovered (Beggs and
Plenz, 2003; Haimovici et al., 2013; Petermann et al.,
2009; Tagliazucchi et al., 2012). As above, further work
is needed to mathematically clarify this important issue.
(iii) Sub-sampling: A related problem is that of sub-
sampling as a result of observational and resolution lim-
itations. Owing to these factors the statistic is not com-
plete, and this might affect the shape of the observed dis-
tributions. Priesemann et al. (2009, 2013, 2014) argued
that –taking into consideration sub-sampling effects– em-
pirical data are best characterized by a slightly sub-
et al., 2009), electroencephalography (EEG) (Allegrini et al.,
2010; Freeman et al., 2003; Meisel et al., 2013), electrocorticog-
raphy (ECoG) (Solovey et al., 2012), magnetoencephalography
(MEG) (Novikov et al., 1997; Palva et al., 2013; Poil et al., 2012;
Shriki et al., 2013), and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) (Haimovici et al., 2013; Tagliazucchi et al., 2012).
27 Some studies suggest that even single neurons can be intrinsically
critical to optimize their inherent excitability (Gal and Marom,
2013; Gollo et al., 2013).
critical dynamics (additionally driven my external forces)
rather than by a critical one.
(iv) Limited scales: In general, no more than two, at
most three, orders of magnitude in avalanche statistics
have been reported which is somehow unsatisfactory. Ob-
taining much broader regimes of scale invariance is tech-
nically challenging, but would make a stronger case for
actual scale-invariance (Yu et al., 2014).
(v) Some authors support different interpretations of
the observed power-laws, which are unrelated to critical-
ity (Be´dard et al., 2006; Destexhe, 2009; Touboul and
Destexhe, 2010, 2017).
These series of observations, taken together, seem to
shed some doubts on evidence in favor of criticality re-
lying on avalanches. To further stregthen it, we now
discuss other complementary experimental signatures of
criticality from different perspectives.
3. The edge of neural synchronization
Much attention has been historically devoted to brain
rhythms observed in EEG, MEG, and LFP measure-
ments (Buzsaki, 2009). Such rhythms emerge owing to
the transient synchronization between different neural re-
gions/circuits, and they play a key role in neural function
(Steriade et al., 1996). Clusters of neurons with coherent
neural activity have a much stronger coordinated effect
on other neuronal assemblies than asynchronous neurons
do (Brunel and Hakim, 2008; Kelso et al., 1986; Scholz
et al., 1987). Thus, phase synchrony is essential for large-
scale integration of information (Varela et al., 2001), and
abnormalities in the level of synchronization –either by
excess or by defect– are a signature of pathologies such
as epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia, or autism
(Yang et al., 2012). Empirically, the measured level of
synchronization across (resting) brain regions and across
time has been found to be highly variable and with strong
long-range correlations. Such spatio-temporal variability
can be interpreted as a template to codify vastly differ-
ent tasks and to allow for a large dynamical repertoire
(Arieli et al., 1996), and has been observed to diminish
when the subject is engaged in a specific task (Tinker
and Velazquez, 2014).
The role that criticality might play in keeping inter-
mediate and variable levels of synchrony –which could
for example be essential to achieve a good balance be-
tween integration and segregation (Tononi et al., 1994)–
has been empirically analyzed as we discuss now. Ana-
lyzing spontaneous bursts of coordinated activity (as in
Fig.5; (Segev and Ben-Jacob, 2001; Segev et al., 2001))
the overall level of phase synchrony between different
electrodes has been recorded under different pharma-
cological conditions, ranging from excitation-dominated
to inhibition-dominated regimes. It was observed that
the is a critical point at which excitation and inhibition
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balance (Yang et al., 2012). At such a point –i.e. at
“the edge of synchrony” (Brunel, 2000; Deco et al., 2014;
Palmigiano et al., 2017)– the level of synchronization
variability is maximal and scale-free avalanches of activ-
ity can be concomitantly observed (Gireesh and Plenz,
2008; Yang et al., 2012). Actually, a recent theoretical
work emphasizes that if the cortex operates at a crit-
ical point, it should be a synchronization critical point,
where marginal synchronization and scale-free avalanches
emerge together (di Santo et al., 2017a). Last but not
least, the amazingly detailed computational model built
within the large-scale collaborative Blue brain project
(Markram, 2006) also suggests that the cortical dynamics
operates at the edge of a synchronization phase transition
(Markram et al., 2015).
4. The edge of global stability
High temporal-resolution electrocorticography data
from human reveal time-varying levels of activity across
different spatial locations (Magnasco et al., 2009; Solovey
et al., 2012). Representing the system’s state at a given
time as a vector, its time evolution can be approximated
as a series of linear (matricial) transformations between
successive time-discrete vector states (Akaike, 1969). By
employing an eigenvector decomposition of each of such
matrices, it is possible to monitor the temporal dynam-
ics of the leading eigenvalues (Lyapunov exponents). In
awake individuals, the leading eigenvalue turns out to
oscillate closely around the threshold of instability, indi-
cating that the dynamics is self-regulated at the edge of
a phase transition between stable and unstable regimes.
Quite remarkably, in anesthetized subjects eigenvalues
become much more stabilized, suggesting that operating
at the edge of stability is a property of functional brain
and that deviations from such point can be used as a
measure of loss of consciousness (Alonso et al., 2014).
5. The edge of percolation
Cortical dynamics can be viewed as a sort of perco-
lation phenomenon. Tagliazucchi et al. (2012) analyzed
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) time se-
ries at different regions of (resting) humans. By thresh-
olding them they obtained discrete spatio-temporal maps
of activity (much as in Fig.5). They found that –using
the density of “active” sites at a given time as a con-
trol parameter, and the size of the largest connected
cluster at each time as a percolation order parameter–
there is a value of the control parameter nearby which
the dynamics spends most of the time and, remarkably,
it corresponds to the value for which the total number
of different connected clusters as well as their size vari-
ability are maximal, as happens at the threshold of per-
colation transitions. These empirical data reveal that
the dynamics is close to the critical percolation density
value, but with broad excursions to both, sub- and super-
critical phases, suggesting that regulatory mechanisms
keep the system hovering around a percolation transition
(much as suggested by the mechanism of “self-organized
quasi-criticality” discussed in Sect.I). In other words, the
resting brain spends most of the time near the point of
marginal percolation of activity, neither too inactive nor
exceedingly active.
6. The edge of a thermodynamic transition
The state of a neural network at a given small time
window can be represented by a binary vector encoding
whether each individual neuron has spiked or remained
silent within it (Tkacˇik et al., 2013). Questions of interest
are, how often does a given simultaneous (i.e. within
a given time bin) spike pattern appear? What is the
simplest probabilistic model (in the sense of equilibrium
statistical mechanics) able to reproduce such statistical
patterns?
Pioneering empirical studies obtained data from large-
scale multielectrode array recordings to determine the
statistics of patterns of neural activity in large popu-
lations of retinal (ganglion) cells of salamander (Marre
et al., 2012). Employing such high-resolution data
and inferring from them maximum-entropy probabilistic
(Ising-like) models (as briefly described in Appendix B),
Tkacˇik et al. (2013) observed that the associated spe-
cific heat diverges as a function of sample size as oc-
curs in thermodynamic critical points. Furthermore, in-
troducing an effective temperature they observed that
empirical data are poised near the critical point of the
(temperature-dependent) generalized model suggesting
that the visual cortex might operate in a close-to-critical
regime (Mora and Bialek, 2011; Mora et al., 2015; Tkacˇik
et al., 2014, 2015).
A possible interpretation of these results –backed by re-
cent empirical evidence (Gautam et al., 2015; Shew et al.,
2015)– is that adaptation to sensory inputs has tuned the
visual cortex to statistical criticality, thus optimizing its
performance. A competing view is that the observed sig-
natures of criticality could reflect an effective averaging
over un-observed variables (such as common external in-
puts in the case of retinal populations), lacking thus any
relationship with possible functional advantages (Aitchi-
son et al., 2016; Nonnenmacher et al., 2017) (see Ap-
pendix B). We refer to Tkacˇik et al. (2015) and Nonnen-
macher et al. (2017) for a more thorough discussions on
these alternative viewpoints.
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7. Large-scale cortical dynamics
Large research initiatives have allowed for the measure-
ment of network of physical (neuro-anatomical) connec-
tions between different regions of the human brain, i.e.
the “human connectome network”28.
On the other hand, functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies performed in the resting-state
–i.e., while the subject is awake not performing any spe-
cific task– reveal the emergence of spatio-temporal pat-
terns of strongly coherent fluctuations in the level of ac-
tivity at the large scale. This allows for the determination
of so-called “resting state networks”, encoding pairwise
correlations between different brain regions, or in words,
brain regions that become active or inactive together,
and that are consistently found in healthy individuals29.
Diverse studies of simple dynamical models on top of
the empirically determined human connectome network
it was found that spatio-temporal correlations similar to
those of the empirically-measured in the resting state are
reproduced only if the models operate close to critical-
ity (Cabral et al., 2011; Fraiman et al., 2009; Haimovici
et al., 2013; Plenz, 2013), suggesting that resting-state
spatio-temporal patterns of activity emerge from the in-
terplay between critical dynamics and the large-scale un-
derlying architecture of the brain. Thus, resting state
networks reflect structured/critical fluctuations among a
set of possible attractors suggestive of a state of alertness
facilitating rapid task-dependent shifts (Deco and Jirsa,
2012; Deco et al., 2013b; Ghosh et al., 2008).
On the other hand, one could expect that scale-
invariance emerges in broad regions of parameter space
and not just at critical points (see Appendix A), owing
to the modular and highly heterogeneous architecture of
structural brain networks. This has indeed been veri-
fied to be true for models of neural activity propagation
(Moretti and Mun˜oz, 2013) as well as for synchroniza-
tion dynamics (Sadilek and Thurner, 2015; Shanahan,
2010; Villegas et al., 2014), and implies that cortical dy-
namics might not be required to be exactly critical to
reproduce empirical findings, but just to be located in a
broad region in parameter space exhibiting generic scale
invariance (e.g. in a Griffiths phase; see Appendix A).
28 The resulting human connectome turns out to be a network or-
ganized in hierarchical modular way (Betzel et al., 2013; Break-
spear, 2017; Hagmann et al., 2008; Kaiser, 2011; Meunier et al.,
2010; Sporns, 2010; Sporns et al., 2004, 2005).
29 See the vast literature on this, e.g. Beckmann et al. (2005);
Biswal et al. (1995); Deco et al. (2011, 2013a); Diez et al. (2015);
Greicius et al. (2003); and Raichle et al. (2001).
8. Disruptions of criticality in pathological conditions
Important pieces of evidence that scale invariance and
criticality might be specific of awake and healthy brain
activity emerge from experimental analyses of neural ac-
tivity under pathology or modified physiological condi-
tions. For example, signatures of criticality have been
reported to fade away during epileptic seizures (Hobbs
et al., 2010; Meisel et al., 2012) as well as during anoma-
lously large periods of wakefulness (Meisel et al., 2013) or
while performing simple tasks (Hahn et al., 2017; Tomen
et al., 2014). Also, long-range temporal correlations –
characteristic of the awake state (Expert et al., 2011; He,
2011)– break down during anesthesia (Bellay et al., 2015;
Ribeiro et al., 2010), unconsciousness (Tagliazucchi et al.,
2016) or under deep sleep (Tagliazucchi et al., 2013), sug-
gesting that critical dynamics is specific to the state of
wakefulness. Interestingly, sleep has been interpreted as
a mechanism to restore the overall dynamics to a critical
state (Pearlmutter and Houghton, 2009).
By pharmacologically altering the ratio of excitation to
inhibition, i.e. breaking the balance condition that char-
acterizes functional neural networks (Barral and Reyes,
2016; Rosenbaum and Doiron, 2014; van Vreeswijk and
Sompolinsky, 1996)– induces a tendency to super-critical
propagation of activity, including many large system-
spanning avalanches, clearly disrupting scale-invariant
behavior (Beggs and Plenz, 2003; Mazzoni et al., 2007).
Similarly, only during naturally balanced conditions the
dynamic range (as defined above) is empirically observed
to be maximal (Gautam et al., 2015; Shew et al., 2009).
There is also experimental evidence supporting the
idea that developing cortical networks go through differ-
ent stages in the process of maturating: they shift from
being supercritical, to subcritical, and then finally, con-
verge towards criticality only when they become mature
(Stewart and Plenz, 2008; Tetzlaff et al., 2010).
Taken together, these observations suggest that crit-
icality is the baseline state of mature, healthy, and
awake neural networks and that deviations from criti-
cality have profound functional consequences (Massobrio
et al., 2015).
9. Mathematical models of neuro-criticality
Since the idea that the computational power of the
brain could emerge out of collective properties of neu-
ronal assemblies (Hertz et al., 1991; Hopfield, 1982),
a large and disparate number of modeling approaches
have been proposed to scrutinize neural dynamics (Amit,
1992; Amit and Brunel, 1997; Dayan and Abbott, 2006;
Izhikevich, 2004, 2007; Kandel et al., 2000; Mattia and
Sanchez-Vives, 2012). These models uncovered a large
variety of phases and possible dynamical regimes such as
up and down states (Hidalgo et al., 2012; Holcman and
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Tsodyks, 2006; Mattia and Sanchez-Vives, 2012; Mejias
et al., 2010; Parga and Abbott, 2007), synchronous and
asynchronous phases (Abbott and van Vreeswijk, 1993;
Brunel, 2000; Brunel and Hakim, 2008), as well as phase
transitions separating them. Our aim here is not to
review them exhaustively but, rather, to discuss those
aimed at justifying the possible emergence of criticality
in actual neural networks.
P. Bak and collaborators are to be acknowledged for
first proposing that concepts of self-organization to crit-
icality could play a role in neural dynamics30. Herz and
Hopfield (1995) realized that stylized (integrate-and-fire)
models of neuronal networks were mathematically equiv-
alent to SOC archetypes.
Short-time synaptic depression (Markram and
Tsodyks, 1996; Sussillo et al., 2007; Tsodyks and
Markram, 1997) was introduced in SOC-like neural-
network models (in which some form of neural “stress”
is accumulated and then released to connected units
in a conserved way) as a mechanism to regulatory
mechanism able to auto-organize them to the edge of a
phase transition (de Arcangelis et al., 2006; Go´mez et al.,
2008; Levina et al., 2007, 2009)31; synaptic resources
become depleted owing to network activity and remain
so for a characteristic recovery period, while they slowly
recover to their baseline level. The alternation of these
activity-dependent mechanisms (i.e. slow charging
and fast dissipation) generates a feedback loop that,
allegedly, guides the networks to criticality, much as in
SOC (Fig.3).
Alternative regulatory (homeostatic) mechanisms such
as spike-timing dependent plasticity (Effenberger et al.,
2015; Meisel and Gross, 2009; Rubinov et al., 2011;
Shin and Kim, 2006), retro-synaptic signals (Hernandez-
Urbina and Herrmann, 2017), and Hebbian plasticity
(de Arcangelis and Herrmann, 2010; Uhlig et al., 2013),
have been proposed to explain self-organization to criti-
cality (Bienenstock and Lehmann, 1998).
However, these SOC-like approaches might not be bio-
logically plausible, as they rely on conservative or almost-
conservative dynamics (while neurons and synapses are
leaky) and, even more importantly, they require of an
unrealistically large (infinite) separation of timescales be-
tween dissipation and recovering to actually self-tune the
dynamics to a critical state (de Andrade Costa et al.,
30 See e.g. Bak (1996); Bak and Chialvo (2001); Chialvo (2004);
Chialvo and Bak (1999); and Stassinopoulos and Bak (1995).
Also, early work by Haken, Kelso and coworkers brought about
the role that critical fluctuations and critical slowing-down might
play in neural dynamics (Haken, 1977, 2013; Kelso et al., 1986;
Scholz et al., 1987).
31 This opened the door to studies of the interplay between criti-
cal dynamics, memory and learning (de Arcangelis, 2011, 2012;
de Arcangelis and Herrmann, 2010, 2012; de Arcangelis et al.,
2014).
2015; Bonachela et al., 2010). If the separation of
timescales in these models is fixed to moderate (finite)
values, critical self-organization is not achieved; instead,
the system hovers around the critical point with excur-
sions to both sides of it –as in the above-discussed self-
organized quasi-criticality (Bonachela and Mun˜oz, 2009;
Kinouchi et al., 2018)– or may become not critical at all
(Bonachela et al., 2010).
To overcome these difficulties an influential model was
proposed to explain self-organized criticality without as-
suming conservative dynamics nor an infinite separation
of timescales (Millman et al., 2010). This model (con-
sisting of a network of leaky integrate-and-fire neurons
with synaptic plasticity) exhibits a discontinuous phase
transition –rather than a continuous one with a criti-
cal point– between states of high and low activity, re-
spectively. This is neurobiologically sound as similar
“up” and “down” states are empirically known to emerge
under deep sleep or anesthesia (Holcman and Tsodyks,
2006; Steriade et al., 1993). Remarkably, the model was
also found to display scale-free avalanches all across its
active phase. This is puzzling from the viewpoint of
models of activity propagation, which generate scale-free
avalanches only at criticality.
This apparent paradox has been recently solved:
avalanches in the model of Millman et al. are not
the result of criticality; they appear owing to the ex-
istence of generic scale invariance, which is a conse-
quence of an underlying neutral dynamics (see Appendix
A). Importantly, such neutral avalanches are detected in
computational models by employing information about
causal relationships on which neuron triggers the fir-
ing of which other (Martinello et al., 2017), and this
type of information is usually not accessible in experi-
ments.32 Furthermore, if avalanches in the model of Mill-
man et al. are measured as in experiments (employing a
time binning) they are not scale-free (Martinello et al.,
2017). Thus, this model –as well as some other simi-
lar ones (Stepp et al., 2015)– do not describe empirical
temporally-defined scale-free avalanches. More generally,
these results reveal a gap in the literature between time-
binned defined avalanches (in experiments) and causally
defined avalanches (in models).
All the above-discussed approaches have in common
that they identify neural criticality with the edge of an
activity-propagation phase transition. Recently, some
other theoretical models have provided theoretical evi-
dence that neural dynamics should exhibit a synchroniza-
tion phase transition, at which neuronal avalanches and
incipient oscillations coexist (Gireesh and Plenz, 2008;
Poil et al., 2012; di Santo et al., 2017a; Yang et al.,
2012). However, these models provide no explanation
32 See, however, Williams-Garcia et al. (2017).
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–other than a possible fine tuning– of why the dynamics
should operate precisely at the edge synchronization.
Last but not least, the amazingly detailed computa-
tional model built within the large-scale collaborative
Blue brain project (Markram, 2006) suggests that the
cortical dynamics operates at the edge of a phase transi-
tion between an asynchronous phase and a synchronous
one with emerging oscillations (Markram et al., 2015).
The regulation of calcium dynamics has been cited as
a possible responsible mechanism for keeping the system
close to such a critical state, operating at a point at which
a whole set of empirical results can be quantitatively ex-
plained by the model (Markram et al., 2015).
Finally, let us comment on two theoretical approaches
–not relying on criticality– proposed to account for scale-
free neuronal avalanches. The first one is a mechanism
called “stochastic amplification of fluctuations” which is
able to produce highly variable avalanches with an (ap-
proximate but not perfect/critical) balance between ex-
citatory and inhibitory couplings together with inherent
stochasticity (Benayoun et al., 2010; Murphy and Miller,
2009). However, this mechanism is not able to reproduce
the empirically observed exponent values (di Santo et al.,
2018).
The second is a recent work, Touboul and Destexhe
(2017), where it is proposed that scale-free avalanches
can naturally emerge in networks of neurons (described
e.g. as a balanced network with excitation and inhibition
(Brunel, 2000), or even as simple Poissonian point pro-
cesses) operating in synchronous irregular regimes away
from criticality. In our opinion, further work needs to be
done to understand how and under which circumstances
this is true, and what are the corresponding values of
the resulting avalanche exponents. Summing up, appeal-
ing empirical evidences as well as sound dynamical mod-
els supporting the idea of criticality in the brain exists;
however, in many cases empirical results are not fully
convincing and alternative theoretical interpretations are
still under debate. Fully clarifying the nature of the over-
all cortical dynamical state remains an open challenge.
B. Gene regulatory networks
Leaving aside neural networks, we move on to another
type of biological information-processing networks that
also exhibit signatures of criticality: genetic networks.
Living cells exhibit stable characteristic features which
are robust even under highly variable conditions. In par-
allel, they also exhibit flexibility to adapt to environ-
mental changes. These two aspects are compatible ow-
ing to the fact that a given set of genes (i.e. a “geno-
type”) can give rise to different cellular states (“phe-
notypes”), consisting of diverse gene-expression patterns
in which some genes are differentially expressed or si-
lenced. Since the pioneering work of Kauffman (1993),
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FIG. 6 The upper panels represent two gene regulatory net-
works: (Left) a large scale one (for E. Coli (Gama-Castro
et al., 2015)) and (Right) a small-scale one (mouse embry-
onic stem-cell subnetwork (Parfitt and Shen, 2014)). In both
cases, nodes stand for genes and links between them for regu-
latory interactions (see main text). The lower panel shows a
sketch of random Boolean networks as simple models of gene
regulation. For low (high) average connectivities they lie in
the ordered (disordered) phase, with a critical point occurring
close to K = 2. The table illustrates a set of logical opera-
tions (associating an output to a set of 3 different inputs) for
a given node in a Boolean setting.
cellular states have been identified as attractors of the
dynamics of gene regulatory networks, where the genes
are the network nodes and their mutual regulatory (ac-
tivation/repression) interactions are represented as di-
rected links between them. Cells can be thought as
“machines” executing complex gene-expression programs
that involve the coordinated expression of thousands of
genes33(Alon, 2006; Buchanan, 2010; Crick, 1970; Ki-
tano et al., 2001; Koonin, 2011; Koonin et al., 2006).
Consequently, the study of information processing in
cells shifted progressively from single genes to increas-
ingly complex circuits/networks of genes and regulatory
interactions, shedding light on collective cellular states
(Garcia-Ojalvo, 2011; Hartwell et al., 1999; Shmulevich
and Dougherty, 2010). The development of powerful ex-
perimental high-throughput technologies in molecular bi-
ology paved the way to the experimental investigation
of gene-expression patterns in large regulatory networks
(Filkov, 2005) and, in particular, provided empirical ev-
idence that sequences of cell states (apoptosis, prolifer-
33 Individual genes are the basic information units of the genetic
code and occupy a central role in biological inheritance and evo-
lution. Gene information is transcribed into RNA molecules and
from them translated into proteins (i.e. “expressed”) which are
the final result of gene expression and the building blocks of
functionality (Crick, 1970).
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ation, differentiation, etc.) can be viewed as programs
encoded in the dynamical attractors of gene regulatory
networks (Albert and Othmer, 2003; Espinosa-Soto et al.,
2004; Huang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2004).
1. Models of genetic regulatory networks
Many genes are empirically observed to exhibit bista-
bility, i.e. their gene-expression levels can be approxi-
mated as either “high” (on) or very “low” (off) depending
on conditions. Such binary states are believed to be the
building blocks of genetic logical circuits (Tyson et al.,
2003). Thus, genetic regulatory networks have been tra-
ditionally modeled as binary information-processing sys-
tems in which the expression level of each gene is repre-
sented by a Boolean (on/off) variable and their interac-
tions are modeled as Boolean functions whose inputs are
the states of other genes (see Fig.6) (Kauffman, 1993;
Shmulevich and Dougherty, 2010).34 Boolean descrip-
tions constitute the most basic and crudest approach to
gene regulatory networks; still, they are particularly ade-
quate to analyze large networks as they reduce the over-
whelming complexity of the real problem to a logical one,
and they have been shown to successfully explain e.g. cell
cycles (Aldana, 2003; Bornholdt, 2005, 2008; De Jong,
2002; Drossel, 2008; Gros, 2008; Kauffman, 1996, 1993;
Serra et al., 2007).
In the simplest setup, the network architecture is de-
scribed as a random directed network35 and regulatory
interactions are described as random Boolean functions
(Albert, 2004; Alon, 2006; De Jong, 2002; Gros, 2008;
Kauffman, 1969, 1993) (see Fig.6). So defined ran-
dom Boolean networks (RBNs) can operate in different
regimes, depending on e.g. their averaged connectiv-
ity. The ordered (low connectivity) is characterized by
a small set of stable attractors which are largely robust
to perturbations, while in the disordered phase (large
connectivity) perturbations rapidly propagate and pro-
liferate hindering the existence of truly stable states.
Separating these two phases there is a critical point at
which perturbations propagate marginally (Derrida and
Pomeau, 1986). More complex models, with e.g. stochas-
ticity and/or continuous levels of activity, exhibit also
such two alternative phases (Rohlf and Bornholdt, 2002).
Kauffman conjectured that models operating at their
critical point might provide the best possible representa-
tion of real gene regulatory networks (Kauffman, 1996,
34 Alternatively, it is also standard to use continuous approaches,
based on reaction-kinetics differential equations (Furusawa and
Kaneko, 2012b; Kaneko and Ikegami, 1992). See De Jong (2002)
for a review.
35 More realistic network architectures including, for example, node
heterogeneity and modularity have also been considered (Aldana,
2003; Poblanno-Balp and Gershenson, 2011).
1993), and that this might entail a large variety of essen-
tial functional advantages (Aldana et al., 2007; Kauffman
et al., 2003; Krawitz and Shmulevich, 2007; Nykter et al.,
2008b; Ribeiro et al., 2008; Torres-Sosa et al., 2012).
In the ordered regime, convergence in state space im-
plies that distinctions between different inputs are readily
erased, precluding reliable discrimination of them. In the
disordered phase, even small perturbations lead to a very
large divergence of trajectories in state space preclud-
ing reliable action (Kauffman et al., 2003). Hence, crit-
icality might confer on such networks an optimal trade-
off between the robustness and accuracy that biological
machinery demands and responsiveness to environmen-
tal clues (Kauffman et al., 2003). At larger evolutionary
scales, criticality might provide networks with an opti-
mal balance between robustness and evolvability under
changing conditions (Aldana et al., 2007; Gershenson,
2012; Kaneko, 2012; Torres-Sosa et al., 2012; Wagner,
2005).
It remains to be clarified how could adaptive (Gell-
Mann, 1994; Gros, 2008) and/or evolutionary (Nowak,
2006) mechanisms, specific of living systems36, lead bi-
ological networks to operate close to criticality. Theo-
retical approaches tackling this question are discussed in
Appendix C.
2. Gene knock-out and damage spreading
DNA microarrays or “DNA chips” are devices allow-
ing to measure the expression levels of large numbers of
genes within a cell as well as to quantify the differences
in expression levels between two cells (Brown and Bot-
stein, 1999). Also, novel technologies made it possible to
perform gene knock-out experiments in which individual
genes are silenced. Combining these two techniques it
became possible to perform “damage spreading” exper-
iments (Derrida and Pomeau, 1986; Rohlf et al., 2007)
in which the difference in gene-expression levels between
perturbed and unperturbed cells in quantitatively moni-
tored. The statistics of the sizes of “avalanches” caused
by single-gene knock-out experiments has been analyzed
using empirical gene-expression data from the yeast (Sac-
charomyces cerevisae) (Hughes et al., 2000), with the
conclusion that the best correspondence between empir-
ical results and (RBN) model predictions is obtained for
the model operating close to its critical point (Ra¨mo¨
et al., 2006; Serra et al., 2007, 2004). However, as a
word of caution, let us stress that, given that expression
levels are noisy, it is necessary to introduce a threshold
expression level to declare when a gene is differentially
36 This is, beyond purely self-organization mechanisms, such as
SOC, also exhibited by inanimate systems (Halley and Winkler,
2008).
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expressed in the two cells. A caveat is that it is not clear
what the influence of thresholding is on the definition of
avalanches and on their associated (size and duration)
probabilities. Thus, even if results are promising, more
precise analyses are still much needed.
3. Networks from DNA microarray data
In a parallel endeavor, empirical analyses of hundreds
of DNA microarray experiments allowed researchers to
infer the whole network of regulatory interactions among
genes, i.e. who regulates whom in a given cell (Filkov,
2005). It has been consistently found that the in-degree
distribution of such regulatory networks is Poissonian,
while the out-degree distribution is scale-free (see Al-
dana (2003), Drossel and Greil (2009), and refs. therein).
Performing damage-spreading computational analyses of
dynamical RBN models running on top of such networks
–with the empirically-determined architecture of diverse
organisms such as S. cerevisiae and E. coli (Albert and
Othmer, 2003)– it was concluded that they all are indeed
very close to criticality, in the sense of marginal propaga-
tion of perturbations (Aldana et al., 2007; Balleza et al.,
2008; Chowdhury et al., 2010; Darabos et al., 2009).
Alternatively to inferring the architecture of the under-
lying network of interactions –which is a difficult problem
(Filkov, 2005)– algorithmic information theory has also
been employed to asses the dynamical state directly from
empirical measurements from DNA-microarray data in
a model-free way (Kauffman et al., 2003; Shmulevich
et al., 2005).37 Analyses of empirical data (for, e.g. the
macrophage) following these protocols produced results
compatible with marginality in the information flow, i.e.
with critical dynamics (Nykter et al., 2008a)38.
4. Zipf’s law in gene-expression data
Inspection of gene expression databases of diverse
unicellular organisms (such as yeast) reveals that the
(continuous-valued) abundances of expressed genes are
distributed as a power-law with exponent close to −1,
obeying the Zipf’s law (Furusawa and Kaneko, 2003)39.
37 For example, one such method relies on computing estimators of
the Kolmogorov complexity (Ming and Vita´nyi, 2014) of sets of
gene-expression time series in diverse microarrays, and comput-
ing how the difference between the information content of any
two system states (Benedetto et al., 2002) changes over time.
38 Similar analyses for Eukaryotic cells gave results compatible with
the dynamics being either ordered or critical but not disordered
(Shmulevich et al., 2005).
39 Indeed, clonal populations of unicellular organisms such as
viruses or bacteria often exhibit phenotypic diversity, which con-
stitutes a sort of “bet-hedging” strategy to cope with unpre-
dictable environmental changes (Kussell and Leibler, 2005; Veen-
ing et al., 2008; Wolf et al., 2005).
Furusawa and Kaneko (2012a) analyzed an abstract dy-
namical (not Boolean) model describing a cellular net-
work (the network formed by the set of molecules which
interact with others to give products within the cell)
with nutrient uptake, and showed that the Zipf’s law
is a universal feature of self-regulated cells optimizing
their growth rate in nutrient-rich environments. In this
setting, cells seem to adapt to criticality to achieve the
maximal capacity to assimilate and use nutrients for re-
cursive formation of other products (Erez et al., 2017;
Furusawa and Kaneko, 2012a; Hanel et al., 2010; Kaneko,
2006; Stokic´ et al., 2008).
C. Collective behavior of cells
We have discussed the possibility of criticality within
the internal networks of individual cells. But, also ensem-
bles of cells –both in social unicellular organisms and in
multicellular ones– may exhibit signatures of scale invari-
ance and criticality in their collective behavior (Nadell
et al., 2013). For instance, in aggregates of the (uni-
cellular) amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum (the “slime
mold”), local cell-cell coupling via secreted chemicals
may be tuned to a critical value (De Palo et al., 2017),
resulting in emergent long-range communication and en-
hanced sensitivity. In the following we discuss some other
examples in multicellular organisms.
1. Stem cell pluripotency
Large diversity in gene-expression levels has been ob-
served in multipotent stem-cell populations of multi-
cellular organisms (Goodell et al., 2015). Multipotent
(hematopoietic) stem cells can differentiate onto either
erythroid or myeloid blood cells –with rather different
functionalities– depending on the expression level of a
gene called Sca1 (Ridden et al., 2015). The empirically
measured distribution of expression levels of Sca1 within
a population of stem cells turns out to be very broad
and with various local maxima. This has been modeled
as a stochastic process, and it has been found that the
model can exhibit two different regimes: either a stable
low-Sca1 or a stable high-Sca1 regime. Separating these
phases there is a line of discontinuous transitions (with
bistability) finishing at a critical point. Remarkably, the
best fit to gene-expression empirical data is obtained fix-
ing model parameters close to criticality, where maximal
variability of the two possible phenotypes is obtained.
Thus, it seems that by adjusting near to criticality, the
stem-cell population is prompt to react and produce ei-
ther erythroid or myeloid cells in response to changing
demands in an optimal way (Ridden et al., 2015). Similar
ideas have been discussed in the more general context of
collective cell decision making (Garcia-Ojalvo and Arias,
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2012; Halley et al., 2009; Lopez-Garcia et al., 2010; Ya-
maguchi et al., 2017), as well as in cancer progression
(Tsuchiya et al., 2015, 2016).
2. Morphogenesis I: Hydra regeneration
Morphogenesis is the biological process at the basis
of the development of multicellular organisms. It is
achieved by a precise control of cell growth, prolifera-
tion, and differentiation. As first suggested in the sem-
inal work of Turing (1952), morphogenesis involves the
creation of self-organized patterns and shapes in the em-
bryo. A prototypical organism studied in this context is
the Hydra polyp, which has a remarkable regeneration
power, as an entire new individual can be spontaneously
re-assembled even from dissociated cells from an adult
individual (Bosch, 2007). Along such a regeneration pro-
cess, first a cell bilayer is formed with a spherical (hollow)
shape. How does the spherical symmetry break down
to form a well-defined foot-head axis in adults? Dur-
ing this process, there is a gene called ks1 that becomes
progressively expressed and that can be transferred to
neighboring cells. It was empirically found that right at
the time when the spherical symmetry is broken, the size
distribution of ks1 -rich domains of cells across the sphere
becomes scale-free and that a spanning cluster emerges,
much as in a percolation phase transition (Gamba et al.,
2012; Soriano et al., 2006). Thus a critical percolation-
like state with collective fluctuations of gene-expression
levels is exploited to break the symmetry, defining a head-
tail axis (Soriano et al., 2006, 2009).
3. Morphogenesis II: Gap genes in Drosophila
A set of so-called “gap” genes is responsible for the
emergence of spatial patterns of gene-expression, that
are at the origin of the formation of different segments
along the head-tail axis in the development of the fruit-fly
(Drosophyla) embryo. Empirical scrutiny of the expres-
sion levels of gap genes along the head-tail axis revealed
a number of remarkable features that include: slow dy-
namics, correlations of expression-level fluctuations over
large distances, non-Gaussianity in the distribution of
such fluctuations, etc. Krotov et al. (2014) proposed a
simple dynamical model in which the process is controlled
by only two mutually repressing gap genes. Assuming
that a fixed point exists, and performing a linear stability
analysis to describe the fate of fluctuations, one readily
finds that there is an instability point as the interaction
strength between the two genes is varied. Krotov et al.
(2014) argued that if the dynamics of the coupled system
is tuned to operate at such an instability point, then it
constitutes an excellent qualitative description of all the
above-mentioned empirical findings, implying that the
gene dynamics operates at criticality. This suggests that
criticality helps defining patterns without a characteris-
tic scale, as required for expanding/developing systems
(see Bose and Pal (2017) and Pal et al. (2014) for a ped-
agogical discussion of these ideas in the general context
of cell differentiation).
D. Collective motion
Collective motion of large groups of individuals is
a phenomenon observed in a variety of social organ-
isms such as flocks of birds, fish schools, insect swarms,
herds of mammals, human crowds (Berdahl et al., 2013;
Bonabeau et al., 1999; Couzin and Krause, 2003; Krause
and Ruxton, 2002; Sumpter, 2010) and also, at smaller
scales, in bacterial colonies (Nadell et al., 2013; Peru-
ani et al., 2012; Ramaswamy, 2010; Sokolov et al., 2007),
and groups of cells in general (Me´hes and Vicsek, 2014).
Flocking, schooling, swarming, milling, and herding con-
stitute outstanding examples of collective phases where
simple interactions between individuals give rise to fas-
cinating emergent behavior at larger scales, even in the
absence of central coordination. Flock of birds and fish
schools behave as plastic entities able to exhibit coherent
motion, including e.g. rapid escape manoeuvres when
attacked by predators, which confers obvious fitness ad-
vantages to the group as a whole (Couzin, 2007, 2009).
Such collective phenomena have attracted the atten-
tion of statistical physicists who have tackled the problem
employing: (i) individual-based models of self-propelled
particles such as the one in Vicsek et al. (1995) which
models collective motion by assuming that an individual
in a group essentially follows the trajectory of its neigh-
bors, with some deviations treated as noise,40 and (ii)
continuum (hydrodynamic) theories, more amenable to
theoretical analysis (Toner and Tu, 1995; Toner et al.,
2005). These approaches have in common the existence
of phase transitions between phases of coherent and in-
coherent motion. For example, in the Vicsek model, a
phase transition from an ordered “flocking phase” to a
disordered “swarming phase” occurs when the density of
individuals goes below a given threshold or, for a fixed
density, when the level of stochasticity is large. This is
consistent with experimental findings; e.g. Buhl et al.
(2006) investigated the social behavior of locusts and re-
ported on a density-driven phase transition from disor-
dered movement of individuals to highly aligned collec-
tive motion as density is increased (Dyson et al., 2015).
At a conceptual level, marginally coordinated (critical)
motion can be hypothesized to constitute an optimal
40 See Chate´ et al. (2008); Chate´ et al. (2008); Ginelli (2016);
and Gre´goire and Chate´ (2004) for detailed statistical-mechanics
analyses of Vicsek models and variants of it.
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tradeoff to deal with conflicting imperatives such as e.g.
(i) the need to behave cohesively as a unique entity and
(ii) being highly responsive to information from transito-
rily well-informed individuals (Couzin et al., 2011, 2005;
De Vincenzo et al., 2017; Vanni et al., 2011). Similar
dichotomies exist in the empirical examples we discuss
now.
1. Flocks of birds
On the empirical side, pioneering work by Cavagna,
Giardina and collaborators (Ballerini et al., 2008; Cav-
agna et al., 2010) on starling flocks allowed to record
individual trajectories (with purposely devised tracking
technology). By analyzing the fluctuations in individ-
ual velocity with respect to the average velocity of the
group, these studies provided remarkable evidence that
long-range scale-invariant correlations may be a general
feature in systems exhibiting collective motion. In par-
ticular, experimentally measured correlations –both in
orientation and speed fluctuations– were found to grow
with flock size in large flocks, suggesting that a correla-
tion length much larger than the interaction range, could
be a common trait of self-organized groups needing to
achieve large-scale coordination (Cavagna et al., 2010).
Let us note that the scale-free correlations in the orien-
tation might be attributed to the broken continuous (ro-
tational) symmetry, which as discussed in Appendix A
leads to generic scale-invariance. However, the presence
of scale-free correlations in the (scalar) speed fluctuations
cannot be explained in this way, suggesting that the flock
might be tuned to a critical point with maximal suscepti-
bility.41 Furthermore, experiments on starling flocks also
allow to measure how the information of the turning of
one individual propagates across the flock, revealing that
this occurs in a very fast and efficient way, which can be
taken as a direct evidence of the existence of scale-free
correlations in flocks (Attanasi et al., 2014a).
Bialek et al. (2012) applied a maximum entropy
method to construct a statistical model consistent with
the empirically measured correlations (see Appendix B).
They concluded that the interaction strength and the
number of interacting neighbors do not change with flock
size in the probabilistic model; and, more importantly,
the model was able to reproduce scale-free correlations
in velocity fluctuations. It was observed (i.e. inferred
from data) that this occurs as a result of the effective
model’s operating close to its critical point (Bialek et al.,
2014; Mora and Bialek, 2011; Mora et al., 2016).
41 Similar results have been obtained for aggregates of a social
amoeba (slime mold) (De Palo et al., 2017), as well as for colonies
of the bacteria Bacillus subtilis in the experimental setup of Chen
et al. (2012) (but not in that of Sokolov et al. (2007), which re-
veals only short-range correlations).
Furthermore, performed
2. Insect swarms
Extensive field analyses of insect (midge) swarms –
which, unlike birds traveling in a flock, hover around
a spot on the ground– have also been performed (At-
tanasi et al., 2014b). By employing finite-size analyses
of the data, Attanasi et al. showed that both the corre-
lation length and the susceptibility grow with the swarm
size, while the spacing between midges decreases. More-
over, such changes with swarm size occur as in the Vicsek
model for finite-size systems sitting near the maximally
correlated point of their transition region at each finite
size42. Thus, midges obey spatio-temporal scaling and,
to achieve it, they seem to regulate their average dis-
tance or density (which acts as a control parameter) so
as to function close to criticality (Attanasi et al., 2014b;
Cavagna et al., 2017; Chate´ and Mun˜oz, 2014). On the
contrary, laboratory experiments of small swarms do not
indicate critical behavior, which may signal that it only
arises in “natural conditions” or for larger sizes (Kelley
and Ouellette, 2013; Puckett and Ouellette, 2014).
3. Mammal herds
Social herbivores (Merino sheep) have also been stud-
ied in well-controlled environments, revealing the exis-
tence of two conflicting needs: (i) the protection from
predators offered by being part of large cohesive group
and (ii) the exploration of foraging space by wandering
individuals. Sheep resolve this conflict by alternating a
slow foraging phase, during which the group spreads out,
with fast packing events triggered by individual behav-
ioral shifts, leading to intermittent collective dynamics
with packing events of all accessible scales, i.e. a “near
critical” state (Ginelli et al., 2015).
4. Social-insect foraging strategies
Studies of ant foraging strategies have been recently
performed (Beekman et al., 2001; Bhattacharya and Vic-
sek, 2014; Gallotti and Chialvo, 2017; Li et al., 2014; Lo-
engarov and Tereshko, 2008; Sole´, 2011). For ant colonies
to achieve an efficient foraging strategy, a tradeoff needs
to be reached between exploratory behavior of some indi-
viduals and predominant compliance with the rules (Fein-
erman and Korman, 2017). It has been found by using
42 The Vicsek model exhibits, at least for not-too-large sizes, a wide
regime where correlations peak at the transition and finite-size-
scaling holds (Baglietto et al., 2012; Chate´ et al., 2008; Gre´goire
and Chate´, 2004; Vicsek et al., 1995).
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a combination of experiments and theory that some ant
groups optimize their overall performance by sitting at
the edge of a phase transition between random explo-
ration and gregarious strategies, thus resulting in effec-
tive criticality. This entails efficient group-level process-
ing of information emerging out of an optimal amplifica-
tion of transient individual information (Gelblum et al.,
2015). Similar ideas are being presently explored for the
design of artificial systems, i.e. in swarm robotics (Beni,
2004; Erskine and Herrmann, 2014).
To further enrich this bird’s-eye view over different as-
pects of criticality in biological systems, a miscellaneous
collection of other examples from the literature is pre-
sented in Appendix C.
V. DISCUSSION
The hypothesis that living systems may operate in
the vicinity of critical points, with concomitant scale-
invariance, has long inspired scientists. From a theoreti-
cal viewpoint this conjecture is certainly appealing, as it
suggests an overarching mechanism exploited by biolog-
ical systems to derive important functional benefits es-
sential in their strive to survive and proliferate. The list
of possible critical features susceptible to be harnessed
by living systems include the unparalleled sensitivity to
stimuli, the existence of huge dynamical repertoires, max-
imal transmission and storage of information, as well as
optimal computational capabilities, among others. When
living systems are interpreted as information-processing
devices –needing to operate robustly but, at the same
time, having to cope with diverse environmental changes–
the virtues of critical behavior are undeniable. Criticality
represents a simple strategy to achieve a balance between
robustness (order) and flexibility (disorder) needed to de-
rive functionality. Similar tradeoffs, as discussed along
the paper (e.g. between stability and evolvability) un-
derline the potential of operating at the edge between
different types of order.
Throughout this essay we focused dynamical aspects
of criticality, meaning that in most of the discussed
examples it is assumed –either directly or indirectly–
that there is an underlying dynamical process at work,
and that such a process –susceptible to be mathemati-
cally modeled– operates in the vicinity of a continuous
phase transition, at the borderline between two alterna-
tive regimes. Such a dynamical perspective is essentially
different from the purely statistical (or static) one, as de-
scribed e.g. in Mora and Bialek (2011). In this latter, the
focus is on analyzing the statistics of existing patterns; it
has the great advantage that it harnesses existing high-
quality empirical datasets. On the other hand, it disre-
gards the possible dynamical generative mechanisms be-
hind them and focused on an effective description (which
can be very useful). Even if both approaches have deep
interconnections, here we chose to focus mostly on the
dynamical one.
Synthesizing (maybe oversynthesizing), one could ar-
gue that the ultimate reason why putative criticality
appears so often in the scrutiny of complex biologi-
cal systems is that it constitutes the simplest phys-
ical/dynamical mechanism generating complex spatio-
temporal patterns spanning through many different
scales, that are all correlated, implying system-wide co-
herence and large responses to perturbations. From this
perspective, critical-like behavior –and the nested hi-
erarchy of spatio-temporal structures it spontaneously
generates– can be identified as a scaffold upon which
(multiscale) biological systems may build up further com-
plexity.
Statistical physics teaches us that under some
circumstances–including e.g. systems with some form of
heterogeneity (relevant for e.g. the study of brain net-
works), or in systems with continuous symmetries (rel-
evant in collective motion) the standard scenario of a
unique critical point separating diverse phases needs to
be replaced by that of extended critical-like regions (such
as e.g. Griffiths phases discussed for the overall brain dy-
namics) where some form of scale invariance emerges in
a generic way. In such cases, it might suffice for biolog-
ical systems to operate in such phases without the need
to invoke precise tuning to the edge of a phase transi-
tion to obtain functional benefits stemming from spatio-
temporal scale invariance.
From the experimental viewpoint, along the presen-
tation we tried to summarize existing empirical pieces
of evidence for each of the discussed examples, stress-
ing possible drawbacks and interpretative problems, and
underlining criticisms raised in the literature. Readers
will extract their own conclusions on whether each of the
examples is sufficiently convincing or not. Our general
impression is that, in most of the cases, larger systems,
more accurate measurements, and less ambiguous anal-
yses would be needed to further confirm or disprove the
existence of an underlying dynamical critical process. For
most of the leading examples (i.e. neural systems, ge-
netic regulatory networks, and collective motion), our
opinion is that, as of today, there is not a fully convinc-
ing proof, where experimental evidence and mathemati-
cal theory/modeling match perfectly; i.e. we still do not
have a “smoking gun”. Still, the existing collection of
remarkable pieces of evidence is extremely appealing and
hard to neglect.
Two important aspects should be considered in future
empirical analyses to make solid progress. One is that,
given that biological systems are finite, they cannot be
truly critical in the precise sense of statistical physics;
thus it is important to perform, whenever possible, finite-
size analyses to prove the existence of scale-invariance
within the experimentally accessible ranges. A second
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aspect is that the two alternative phases that the al-
leged criticality separates should be clearly identified in
each case. From this view, we find particularly appeal-
ing pieces of evidence (e.g. in neuroscience) in which,
by experimentally inducing alterations to standard con-
ditions, deviations from criticality are measured in oth-
erwise critical-looking systems.
A general criticism can be raised to some of the anal-
yses discussed along this work, specifically, to those in
which the evidence relies on the existence of a theoret-
ical model that provides, when tuned close to its criti-
cal point, the best possible fit to empirical observations.
The criticism is that, if feature-rich empirical data with
structures spanning over broadly diverse scales are con-
sidered, then it seems almost a tautology to conclude
that the best possible representation of them is obtained
by fitting the proposed dynamical model to operate close
its critical point, as this is typically the only region in
parameter space where complex (feature-rich) patterns,
with many scales, are generated. In contrast, from an
opposite perspective, if actual biological data are struc-
tured across many scales, it does not seem too far fetched
to assume –applying the Occam’s razor– that a general
common mechanism may underlie the emergence of such
a hierarchy of scales, and the main candidate mechanism
for this consists in operating at the edge of a continuous
phase transition, i.e. being close to criticality. Thus, we
are confronted with a (epistemological) dichotomy: Is the
putative criticality of living systems just a reflection of
the limitation of our models which can possibly resemble
large levels of “complexity” only at criticality? or, on
the contrary, is criticality actually a common organizing
principle at the roots of the generation of many levels of
organization required for complex biological behavior to
emerge? Providing a satisfactory answer to these ques-
tions is a problem of outmost importance to advance in
the theoretical understanding and modeling of complex
living systems.
Even if diverse biological systems were finally proved to
be genuinely critical, some researchers might still retain
this conclusion as largely uninformative or even irrele-
vant. It could be asked: “so what?”. What practical
implications could be derived from such a knowledge?
In our opinion, the design of strategies to control neu-
ral/genetic networks –especially those aiming at resolv-
ing pathologies– based on notions of criticality, the con-
struction of algorithms of artificial intelligence exploiting
scale-invariance at different layers, or the application of
ideas of collective motion/intelligence to the design of e.g.
swarms of robots, could constitute important avenues to
provide constructive answers to the above question.
Novel advances, both at the experimental and theo-
retical sides, will help elucidating what is the actual role
played by criticality and scale invariance in biological sys-
tems; meanwhile the mere possibility remains as inspiring
as ever and, definitely, worth pursuing.
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APPENDIX A: GENERIC SCALE INVARIANCE
There are situations in which spatio-temporal scaling
may emerge without the need of parameter fine tuning
(Grinstein, 1991). (i) A well-known example is the break-
ing of a continuous symmetry in low-dimensional sys-
tems, as it happens e.g. in some models of magnetism
in which each spin can point in any arbitrary direction
in a plane (Binney et al., 1993). These systems, instead
of the usual ordered phase at low temperature, exhibit
a broad “quasi-ordered” phase characterized by local or-
der together with generic power-law decaying correlations
(Grinstein, 1991). This type of ordering is relevant for
bacterial-colony patterns (Ramos et al., 2008) as well as
in the analysis of collective motion (see Sect. IV-C).
(ii) Generic scale invariance can also emerge in the
presence of structural disorder or heterogeneity. In sta-
tistical physics, one refers to “quenched disorder” as
the form of spatial-dependent heterogeneity which is
intrinsic to the microscopic components and remains
frozen in time, reflecting structural heterogeneities.
Quenched disorder can alter the nature of phase tran-
sitions (Villa Mart´ın et al., 2014; Vojta, 2006) and can
also induce novel phases absent in homogeneous systems.
For instance, in the contact process, quenched disor-
der can be implemented by considering a lattice with
some missing links, a more complex (disordered) net-
work of connections, and/or a node-dependent propa-
gation rate λ. In all these cases, a novel phase called
a Griffiths phase –characterized by critical-like features
appearing all across the phase and not just at a unique
point– emerges (Cafiero et al., 1998; Moreira and Dick-
man, 1996; Mun˜oz et al., 2010; Vojta, 2006).
(iii) Another mechanism that produces a type of
generic scale-invariance relevant in biological systems
(see e.g. Sect. IV-A7) is “neutral dynamics”. Neutral
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theories play a key role in population genetics (Kimura,
1984), population ecology (Azaele et al., 2016; Hubbell,
2001), epidemics (Pinto and Munoz, 2011), etc. They
have in common the fact that differences among possi-
ble coexisting “species” (let them be alleles of a gene,
types of trees, bacterial strains,...) are neglected. In
other words, all “species” are dynamically equivalent or
neutral (Blythe and McKane, 2007; Dornic et al., 2001;
Liggett, 2004). It has been recently shown that in a
(“multispecies”) contact process that includes different
types/species of activity, if a new species –neutral to the
exiting ones– is introduced, it experiences a stochastic
process in which its total population does not have a net
tendency to either grow or shrink. This generates gener-
ically scale-free avalanches of the focal species unfolding
in a sea of activity of the other species, without the need
to invoque criticality (Martinello et al., 2017).
APPENDIX B: PROBABILISTIC MODELS AND
STATISTICAL CRITICALITY
Probabilistic models can be constructed such that they
match the statistics of observed empirical data (Rieke
et al., 1995). Without loss of generality, an empirically
observed pattern at a given time window can be codified
as a sequence of binary variables of length N : si = 0, 1
for i = 1, 2, ...N . Denoting P (s) the (unknown) proba-
bility of finding the system in the state s = (s1, s2, ...sN )
it is possible to approximate it by a distribution function
with the constraint that it reproduces the empirically-
measured mean values 〈si〉 for all i, as well as the covari-
ances 〈sisj〉 for all i and j. Imposing a maximum entropy
principle (i.e. selecting the model with the smallest num-
ber of assumptions43) it is straightforward to derive the
explicit form of the optimal model
P (s) =
1
Z
exp
∑
i<j
Jijsisj +
∑
i
hisi
 (5)
where Z ensures normalization and which coincides with
the Boltzmann equilibrium distribution of the Ising-like
model, and where the free parameters hi and Jij need
to be fitted, so that the imposed constraints are satisfied
(Ackley et al., 1985).44
Bialek and coworkers introduced an efective parameter
β –much as an inverse temperature in equilibrium statis-
tical mechanics– multiplying each estimated parameter
43 In information theory, the entropy of a probability distribution
quantifies the ignorance about the variable; thus, making no as-
sumptions about the distribution is equivalent to maximizing the
entropy (Banavar et al., 2010a; Cover and Thomas, 1991).
44 Obtaining the optimal parameter set –i.e. inferring effective in-
teractions from correlations– is a computationally costly task,
usually referred as “inverse Ising problem” (Aurell and Ekeberg,
2012; Cocco et al., 2009; Schneidman et al., 2006).
in the inferred model Eq.(5). Clearly, varying β a rela-
tive change of the weights assigned to different configura-
tions is produced. In this way one generates a family of
β-dependent probability distributions, P (s|βg), interpo-
lating between the low and high temperature phases45.
At some intermediate value, βc, there is a critical point
(as identified e.g. by a peak in the susceptibility or the
specific heat). It has been found that diverse inference
problems (from retinal populations (Schneidman et al.,
2006; Tkacˇik et al., 2014, 2013, 2015) to flocks of birds
(Bialek et al., 2012), and the immune system (Mora et al.,
2010)) produce models in which βc ≈ 1, –or converges to
1 as the system size is enlarged– i.e. that inferred models
appear to be close to the very critical point of the under-
lying Ising-like problem (see Mora and Bialek (2011) for
a clear and pedagogical discussion of these issues).
Let us also mention that there is an ongoing debate
on the interpretation of these results. In particular, it
has been shown that signatures of criticality may emerge
naturally in inferred models if there is a marginalization
over non-observed variables, such as e.g. correlated ex-
ternal inputs, even without the need for direct interac-
tions among units Aitchison et al. (2016) and Schwab
et al. (2014). More in general, Marsili and collaborators
pointed out that the alleged criticality of such models
can be a rather general consequence of the inference pro-
cedure, meaning that inferred models fitting real-world
(“feature-rich” or “informative” ) data do, most likely,
look critical when an effective probabilistic model is con-
structed (Haimovici and Marsili, 2015; Marsili et al.,
2013; Mastromatteo and Marsili, 2011; Tyrcha et al.,
2013). We shall not delve further into the controversy
about the meaning and significance of this type of purely
statistical approaches to criticality (see also the Discus-
sion section).
APPENDIX C: ADAPTATION AND EVOLUTION
TOWARDS CRITICALITY
To shed light onto the general problem of how
information-processing (living) systems tune themselves
to operate near critical points, Goudarzi et al. (2012)
considered an ensemble of individuals or “agents”, each
represented as an internal RBN, including some input
nodes (able to read information from the environment)
and some readout nodes (providing outputs/responses).
Such agents evolve though a genetic algorithm (Goldberg
and Holland, 1988) that allocates larger “fitness” values
to agents that perform better a series of computational
tasks (each one consisting in assigning a given output to
45 At β = 0 (infinite temperature) all configurations are equiprob-
able, while in the opposite limit all the weight concentrates on
the most likely (fully ordered) configuration.
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each specific input), which are alternated in time. The
conclusion is that agents converge to a state close to crit-
icality; i.e. critical dynamics emerge as the optimal solu-
tion under the combined selective pressures of having to
learn different tasks and being able to readily shift among
them, following changes in the tasks. Instead, in the pres-
ence of noise, optimal agents tend to be slightly subcrit-
ical, rather than critical, thus compensating for extrinsic
sources of variability (Villegas et al., 2016). In a similar
approach, Hidalgo et al. (2014) showed that communities
of similar adaptive agents, whose task is to communicate
with each other (inferring their respective internal states)
in an efficient way, converge to quasi-critical states. This
result constitutes a possible parsimonious explanation for
the emergence of critical-like behavior in groups of in-
dividuals coordinating themselves as a collective entity
(Hidalgo et al., 2016) (see also Iliopoulos et al. (2010)).
APPENDIX D: OTHER PUTATIVELY CRITICAL LIVING
SYSTEMS
Here we briefly discuss, a sample of other biological
systems for which empirical evidences of criticality exist.
Cell membranes. Cell membranes are not just rigid
impenetrable walls separating the interior of cells from
the outside environment; they regulate the kind, direc-
tion, and amount of substances that can pass across
them. Cell membranes are permeable only at some lo-
cations and, for this, their local composition needs to be
heterogeneous (Cicuta, 2013; Hyman and Simons, 2012;
Lee et al., 2013). There is compelling empirical evidence
that the mixture of lipids that constitute the skeleton
of cell membranes operates very close to the (de-mixing)
phase transition at which their different components seg-
regate (Cicuta, 2013; Ehrig et al., 2011; Honerkamp-
Smith et al., 2008; Veatch et al., 2008, 2007). In this
way, composition fluctuations are extremely large, en-
abling very diverse structural domains to appear, thus
providing the membrane with a large spectrum of pos-
sible local structures, at which different processes may
occur, and entailing a rich repertoire of functionalities.
RNA viruses. RNA viruses are believed to repli-
cate at the edge of an “error catastrophe”. If the error
rates for copying the viral genome were very small RNA
viruses would have little variability, hindering adaptation
and evolution. Instead, if they were too large then the
fidelity of the replication machinery would be compro-
mised and it would not be possible to maintain important
genetic elements nor the identity of the (quasi)species it-
self (Eigen et al., 1989; Eigen and Schuster, 1979). It was
conjectured (Drake and Holland, 1999; Eigen, 2002; Sole´
et al., 1999, 1996) and has been (partially) verified in
recent experiments (Crotty et al., 2001; Hart and Fergu-
son, 2015) that RNA viruses might operate right at the
edge of the catastrophe, providing them with maximal
variability compatible with genotypic robustness46.
Physiological rhythms. The presence of tempo-
ral scale-invariance in physiological rhythms of healthy
subjects, as well as its break-down in abnormal condi-
tions, have been long explored (Bassingthwaighte et al.,
1994; Goldberger et al., 2002; Losa, 1995). In particular,
to mention one example, a specific connection between
the complex fluctuations of human heart-rate variabil-
ity and criticality has been put forward (Ivanov, 2007;
Ivanov et al., 1999; Kiyono et al., 2004, 2005). In the
related context of blood-pressure regulation, vaso-vagal
syncopes have been identified as large “avalanches” in a
self-organized cardiovascular regulatory system poised at
criticality (Fortrat and Gharib, 2016). In general, such a
regulation to scale-free behavior seems to impart health
advantages, including system integrity and adaptability
(Goldberger et al., 2002).
Miscellanea. Criticality has also been claimed to
play a relevant role in the immune system (Burgos and
Moreno-Tovar, 1996; Mora et al., 2010), cancer and
carcenogenesis (Davies et al., 2011; Rosenfeld, 2013; Sole´
and Deisboeck, 2004; Sole´, 2003), proteins (Phillips, 2009;
Tang et al., 2017), mitochondria (Aon et al., 2004; Zam-
poni et al., 2018), etc. Also, quantum criticality and its
relevance for the origin of life at the microscopic scale
has been the subject of a recent proposal (Vattay et al.,
2015). Finally, let us mention that ecosystems as a whole
have been studied –from a macroevolutionary viewpoint–
as dynamical structures lying at the edge of instability
(Adami, 1995; Bak and Sneppen, 1993; Biroli et al., 2017;
Sneppen et al., 1995; Sole´ et al., 2002a, 1999; Suweis
et al., 2013), illustrating that the ideas discussed here
can be extended to larger scales in the hierarchy of bio-
logical complexity.
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